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Taking the Aid Debate to the Sub-National Level:  
Impact and Allocation of Foreign Health Aid in Malawi 
 
Robert A. Marty 
The College of William & Mary 
 
 
Abstract— I examine the allocation and impact of foreign health aid at the sub-national 
level in Malawi. The literature remains divided over the impacts of health aid— some 
scholars fail to find significant relations between health aid and health outcomes, while 
others praise notable impacts. Moreover, the approaches scholars use to examine impacts 
are as polarized as their results— aid impacts are primarily examined using cross-national 
analyses or at the project level. However, the emergence of geocoded aid data allows for 
a new analytical approach, one of examining aggregate health aid within a country. I use 
an AIC-based hierarchical model averaging approach to determine the best predictor 
variables of health aid in four time periods, examining how health aid is allocated 
according to socio-economic factors, health conditions, and ethnic preferencing. In 
addition, I use propensity score matching methods to examine the causal impacts of 
health aid. Results show that aid is generally not allocated to the poorest individuals, but 
results are mixed over allocation according to health conditions. In addition, only one 
year, 2010, shows evidence of possible ethnic preferencing influencing aid allocation. 
Despite mixed results of allocation, propensity score matching methods show health aid 
causing statistically significant improvements in health conditions in 2008, 2009, and 
2010, causing a reduction of 0.3 to 5 million cases of illness annually. Results highlight 
notable aggregate health aid impacts, despite potential inefficiencies or negative 
consequences of aid.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Easterly opposed bednet distribution. [The World Bank] rejected Easterly's advice, and 
cut malaria sharply. Yes, debate's over. Aid works! 
—Jeffrey Sachs, 2014 
 
The big aid debate that Sachs initiated is now really over… His idea that aid could 
achieve rapid development and the end of poverty was wrong, and it's time to move on. 
—William Easterly, 2013 
 
 In the past twenty years, foreign health aid has quintupled, increasing from $5.7 
billion in 1990 to $26.9 billion in 2010 (Butler 2011). The growing commitment to 
address health challenges abroad has been matched by scholars seeking to evaluate these 
well-intentioned efforts. However, the current literature is riddled with contrasting results 
rather than consensus as to whether health aid works or not (despite scholars on both 
sides of the debate claiming that ‘the debate is over’) (Easterly 2013; Murphy 2014; 
Sachs 2014). Some find claims of foreign health aid effectiveness to stop at rhetoric, 
failing to find significant empirical relationships between health aid and improved health 
outcomes (Williamson 2008; Gebhard et al 2008; Wilson 2011; Kizhakethalackal 2009). 
Others empirically show notable impacts of health aid, praising impacts and urging 
donors to increase funding (Demombynes and Trommlerova 2012; Fegan et al 2007; 
Sachs 2014; Mishra and Newhouse 2007; Feeny and Ouattara 2013).  
 As polarized as the results are the approaches scholars use to examine aid 
impacts, with certain analyses leading towards certain results. Macro-level analyses that 
use the country as the unit of analysis and ask whether aid causes aggregate health 
outcomes to improve largely show health aid to be ineffective or minimally effective. The 
most promising results of health aid have come from project-level evaluations, where 
scholars have analyzed the impact of specific health interventions. Contrasting results 
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have fueled the aid debate, but also have caused scholars to ask why aid may be 
successful at the project level while aggregate aid may be “less the sum of its parts.” In 
particular, some scholars argue that potential negative consequences of aid wash out 
aggregate impacts (Howes, Otor, and Rogers 2011). In this paper I examine health aid 
from a middle ground, broadening the unit of analysis from the project-level and 
narrowing the unit of analysis from the macro-level. Specifically, I examine health aid at 
the sub-national level, examining the aggregate impact of all health aid projects within a 
country. The emergence of geographically referenced aid information makes this type of 
analysis possible.  
Sub-national aid data offers a new lens to view foreign aid, allowing old questions 
to be asked in different ways, and entirely new questions to be asked altogether. As 
opposed to project-level analyses, cumulative impacts of aid can be examined to better 
understand its aggregate impact in a country. This is especially important in light of 
scholars arguing that negative impacts of aggregate aid could make its overall impact 
insignificant. Additionally, as opposed to asking if aid improves country-level health 
indicators, questions of aid effectiveness can ask where aid was allocated within a 
country and if individuals in those specific areas benefited. To date, no peer-reviewed 
study has examined the impact of aggregate health aid at the sub-national level. This 
paper fills that gap.    
I examine the allocation and impact of foreign health in Malawi at the sub-
national level. Malawi is chosen because it has the first fully geocoded dataset of reported 
aid projects, which was developed by the Malawi Ministry of Finance in partnership with 
the AidData Center for Development Policy. However, Malawi provides an ideal case 
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study due to reasons beyond data availability. Malawi remains one of the poorest 
countries in the world, facing among the highest rates of disease burdens. Over 90% of 
the population lives on less than 2 dollars a day, and the United Nations Development 
Index ranked Malawi 171 out of 187 countries (UNDP 2010; Wroe 2012). Additionally, 
Malawi faces the ninth highest HIV prevalence in the world, and malaria accounts for 
34% of all outpatient clinical visits ("Department for International Development: Aid to 
Malawi" 2009; Presidents Malaria Initiative 2014). With poor conditions, Malawi has 
received above-average amounts of per-capita development assistance. In 2010, out of 
the forty-eight countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Malawi received the 25th highest per 
capita amounts of foreign aid, $16.5 higher than the average in sub-Saharan Africa 
(World Bank 2014). Poor conditions and high amounts of aid suggest that foreign aid 
could have a significant ‘bang for its buck.’ However, a number of cases of corruption 
have caused donors to express concern about aid effectiveness, and in some instances 
have caused them to cancel aid contracts. Therefore, examining aid effectiveness within 
Malawi itself is particularly warranted.  
This paper asks two main questions. First, I ask how aid is allocated. I examine 
how health aid relates to a number of factors that measure ‘need,’ including a variety of 
socio-economic and health variables. Additionally, I examine the importance of political 
factors driving allocation, specifically examining whether aid is more likely to go to 
individuals that are of the same ethnic group as the president (here, Bingu wa Mutharika). 
Second, I ask what impact (if any) health aid has on health conditions. Further insight 
comes from combing results of the two questions, asking how allocation might influence 
aid effectiveness.  
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The paper is organized as follows. First, I overview the literature relating to the 
allocation and impact of aid. Second, I place the analysis in its country-specific context 
by examining both the health conditions and history of foreign aid to Malawi. Third, I 
describe the data and present how each variable could affect aid allocation and health 
conditions. Fourth, I examine the allocation of foreign health aid, asking how aid 
responds to socio-economic, health, and political variables. Fifth, I examine the 
determinants of health outcomes, asking how important health aid is compared to other 
variables and gaining initial insights into health aid impacts. Sixth, I examine the causal 
impact of health aid. Discussion and conclusions follow. 
 
2. AID ALLOCATION AND IMPACT 
2.1 Allocation of Foreign Aid 
From an aid-effectiveness perspective it is not sufficient to look at countries only, 
because countries often include a wide variety of different regions with different 
characteristics and degrees of need… Despite its importance for aid effectiveness, the 
distribution of aid across sub-national regions receives very little attention in both 
development theory and practice. 
—Elena Pietschmann, 2014 
 
 Studies examining the allocation of aid have historically focused on the cross-
national level, using individual countries as the unit of analysis. Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) find that both need and political factors, including colonial past and political 
alliances, drive aid allocation. Dollar and Levin (2004) confirm that both poverty and 
political factors drive allocation; however, institutions and political factors have only 
become important for aid allocation in the past couple decades. Scholars have also 
highlighted differences in how countries allocate aid. For example, China, like many 
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countries, allocates according to political considerations, whereas institutional factors, 
such as democracy and governance, are not important (Dreher and Fuchs 2011). In 
contrast, Nordic countries particularly respond to openness and good institutions (Alesina 
and Dollar 2000). The United States preferences counter-terrorism and the Middle East 
peace process in allocating aid (Bortolleto 2011), while France preferences its former 
colonies (Alesina and Dollar 2000).  
 While cross-national analysis offers insights into political motivations for 
allocating aid, it is limiting in explaining whether aid is given to individuals most in need 
(Powell and Findley 2011; Pietschmann 2014). For example, while literature offers that 
donors generally give funding to countries with high need, it offers no insight as to 
whether funds go to the poorest regions or people within that country. Additionally, while 
the literature shows that political factors influence which countries receive aid, it says 
nothing about how political factors influence aid allocation at the country-level. 
Therefore, sub-national analysis offers unique insight into whether aid is effectively 
allocated within a country (Glassman 2014; Pietshmann 2014).  
 While at the cross-national level donors drive aid allocation, at the sub-national 
level both donors and recipient governments influence where aid is allocated. Jablonski 
(2014) notes that, “[i]n nearly all but the most unstable political environments, donors 
cooperate with government agencies in order to allocate aid.” Donor-recipient 
cooperation stems from the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which 
emphasizes reliance on, “local government institutions for the provision of development 
services when possible” (Jablonski 2014). In addition, the type of aid can influence the 
control over funds. Aid in the form of budgetary support is entirely at the discretion of 
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government ministries, whereas aid towards particular development projects will see 
more donor-recipient cooperation in deciding how much funding to give and where aid 
should be directed. However, donors often delegate responsibility of aid management 
because recipient governments have greater information on how to best allocate aid 
(Jablonski 2014; “Financial Management in Action,” 2010).   
Sub-national analysis of foreign aid has largely been a neglected topic. Donors 
themselves scarcely mention sub-national allocations. Higgins, Bird, and Harris (2010) 
reviews policy documents from major donors and finds that only one agency, the 
Australian Agency for International Development, addresses the issue of sub-national 
disparities. Pietschmann (2014) argues that this “suggests that regional inequalities are 
not a policy priority for donors.” However, a literature examining the sub-national 
allocation of aid has begun to emerge with the growing availability of geocoded aid data 
(Pietschmann 2014). The creation of such data has been driven in part by a demand for 
greater transparency of aid flows (Chandy et al 2013).   
 Sub-national analysis has brought light to potential inefficiencies of aid 
allocation. Chandy et al (2013) examine whether foreign aid is allocated to the poorest 
regions within a country by combining data from the World Bank’s “Mapping for 
Results” initiative and country-level poverty data. In examining twenty-four countries 
that collectively contain 359 aid projects, they find that aid is largely not allocated to the 
poorest regions. Despite Jablonski (2014) highlighting how governments often delegate 
aid management to recipient governments, Piva and Dodd (2009) help explain inefficient1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For simplification, I define ‘efficient allocation’ as aid going to those most in need. However, as will be 
discussed later, there are valid reasons why aid may be allocated according to other considerations but may 
still be considered “effective.” This definition, though, provides a helpful benchmark for evaluating how 
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allocation by arguing that recipient governments may be limited in their ability to allocate 
effectively. They argue:  
“While global levels of health aid are clearly rising, it is less clear whether the 
amount of money available to countries to allocate flexibly, in accordance with 
their health priorities and health system development needs, is also increasing.” 
Additionally, Powell and Findley (2012) use sub-national analysis to examine donor 
coordination, where they define good coordination as donors clustering in areas with 
great need or spreading out in areas of diffuse need. Overall, they find lack of donor 
coordination and ineffective aid allocation.  
 Aid allocation is also influenced by political factors at the sub-national level. 
Jablonski (2014) geocodes multilateral aid projects in Kenya from 1992 to 2010 to show 
that “Kenyan governments have consistently influenced the aid allocation process in 
favor of co-partisan and co-ethnic votes.”2 Hodler and Raschky (2010) generalize this 
claim. They examine 22,850 regions in 91 aid recipient countries and find that in 
countries with poor political institutions, aid fuels favoritism and largely goes to the 
leader’s birth region. Hodler and Raschky (2010) further show that donors may be limited 
in their ability to prevent governments in recipient countries from directing aid according 
to political considerations. However, some evidence suggests that health sector aid may 
be sparred being driven by political patronage. Dietrich (2011) argues that corrupt 
governments have incentives to comply with donor objectives in the health sector in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Jablonski (2014) further argues that, “[w]hile governments may care about economic development, 
disaster relief, or other development objectives, their first priority is to remain in power. As a result, 
governments will try to take advantage of the situation and use information donors are not privy to in order 
to ensure that electorally strategic voters receive higher levels of foreign aid. Donors often lack the 
ability—or willingness—to distinguish between the neediest and the most politically expedient recipients, 
and as a result, the latter may receive a larger share of aid. Moreover, by giving governments discretion 
over aid allocation, donors may inadvertently create a demand among voters that their elected 
representatives provide more aid to their districts.”	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order to justify additional flows in other sectors that may fuel rent seeking behavior. 
Therefore, examining how health aid allocation specifically responds to political factors 
could be particularly revealing.  
 
2.2 The Impact of Foreign Health Aid 
There is a lack of evidence to indicate that health aid should be pursued as a policy 
objective to promote increases in human welfare… Just like general aid, which is shown 
to have an insignificant effect on economic development, aid used specifically for health 
goals has an insignificant effect on human development. 
—Claudia Williamson, 2008 
 
The critics of foreign aid are wrong. A growing flood of data shows that death rates in 
many poor countries are falling sharply, and that aid-supported programs for health-
care delivery have played a key role. Aid works; it saves lives. 
          —Jeffrey Sachs, 2012 
 
 
 The literature remains divided about the impact of foreign health aid. Some 
scholars fail to find significant relations between health aid and health outcomes, others 
find that aid does improve health outcomes, albeit to a small degree, while others praise 
the impacts of health aid, emphasizing the link between reducing disease burdens and 
promoting economic growth. Contrasting results represents a broader ‘micro-macro’ 
paradox, where macro-level analyses largely showed aid to be ineffective or minimally 
effective, while micro-level analysis praise the impacts of specific health projects 
(McGillivary et al 2005). Mosley (1986), who first drew attention to this paradox, 
questioned:   
What is going on? Is it true as the data suggest that aid projects are succeeding 
while aid as a whole is failing, if so how? Or do the data in fact deceive? 
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Howes, Otor, and Rogers (2011) summarize four reasons why the paradox might be true, 
or the “aggregate impact of aid [may be] less the sum of its parts:” (1) aid may be 
fungible, that is aid projects may succeed but the benefits may have occurred even if 
there was no aid funding;3 (2) aid could put upward pressure on exchange rates if aid is 
used to purchase non-traded goods, having negative growth impacts, (3) aid may reduce 
citizen expectations of their government, leading to poor governance (also see Moss, 
Pettersson, and van de Walle 2006), and (4) aid may lead to a brain-drain of civil service 
members to the better-paying donor community, harming economic management and 
performance. In lieu of cross-national regressions, Picciotto (2009) uses case studies of 
World Bank project performance ratings to determine whether a micro-macro paradox 
exists or if discrepancies resulted from “data deception.” He ultimately concludes that a 
paradox exists in a third of the cases, where negative effects of aggregate aid reduced 
macro-level impacts. However, Howes, Otor, and Rogers (2011) reevaluate Picciotto’s 
study, finding that two-thirds of the cases that Picciotto argued had a micro-macro 
paradox had “nothing to do with negative effects of aggregate aid.” Ultimately, they 
argue that while cross-national studies can be useful, “in the Picciotto case, the data do 
deceive.”   
Williamson (2008) first examined the impact of foreign aid specifically directed 
to the health sector. She examines the impact of health aid on a number of different 
health indicators and finds that while the estimators on health aid exhibit correct signs 
(aid having a positive impact), health aid does not show statistically significant impacts. 
As a result, she concludes that foreign health aid is ineffective and should not be pursued 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For example, Swaropp and Devarajan (1998) present research that shows that “aid intended for crucial 
social and economic sectors often merely substitutes for spending that recipient governments would have 
undertaken anyway and the funds that are thereby freed up are spend for other purposes.”	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as a policy option. A number of scholars corroborate Williamson’s (2008) results. 
Gebhard et al (2008) examine the impact of bilateral and multilateral health aid on a 
number of health indicators from 1980 to 2005. They find that health aid has a positive 
but negligible impact on health conditions, especially compared to the impact of GDP on 
health conditions. Ultimately, they conclude that, “health aid may not improve the health 
performance of the average recipient country.” Similarly, Wilson (2011) finds that 
economic growth strongly impacts health conditions while health aid does not. Moreover, 
he argues that instead of causing improvements in health outcomes, foreign health aid 
instead goes to places that “have experienced the greatest mortality reductions in the 
recent past.” In short, he argues that foreign health aid appears to follow success rather 
than cause it. Kizhakethalackal (2009) empirically examines the impact of health aid on 
infant mortality rates and incidence of tuberculosis using a number of econometric 
approaches. She robustly fails to find significant relations between health aid and health 
outcomes, and ultimately concludes that “health-aid does not work.”  
 William Easterly (2003) is one of the largest critics of foreign aid. He argues that, 
at best, aid is equipped to “benefit some of the people some of the time,” rather than 
“[try] to be the catalyst for society-wide transformation.” Some empirical evidence 
corroborates this argument, finding that foreign health aid does have small impacts on 
health conditions, or “helps some of the people some of the time.” Mishra and Newhouse 
(2007) examine the impact of health aid on infant mortality, using data on 118 countries. 
They find that health aid does have statistically significant impacts. Specifically, they 
find that “increasing per capita health aid by $1.60 per year is associated with 1.5 fewer 
deaths per thousand births.” However, they conclude that this estimated effect is small, 
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especially compared to targets set by the Millennium Development Goals. Taylor et al. 
(2013) analyze the literature that examines progress towards Millennium Development 
Goal five, which concerns improving maternal and reproductive health. They find that the 
literature points to aid being associated with small yet improving health outcomes. 
Furthermore, Feeny and Ouattara (2013) find that health aid has a statistically significant 
impact on increasing immunization against measles and Diphtheria-Pertussis-Tetanus 
(DPT) at the cross-national level, ultimately arguing that health aid does improve child 
health.  
 In opposition to Easterly, other scholars argue that foreign aid, especially health 
aid, can “be a catalyst for society wide transformation.” Gallup and Sachs (2001) show 
that a 10% reduction in malaria is associated with 0.3% higher growth per year. They 
further report that malaria alone costs Africa over $12 billion annually, and in some 
African countries has slowed economic growth by as much as 1.3% per year. In a foreign 
affairs article, Shah (2013) purports that “[t]he story of malaria is inseparable from the 
history of poverty . . . Getting rid of this one disease could simultaneously slash mortality 
rates and inhibit a major drain on economic growth.” In particular, disease burdens 
diminish the tax base a state can draw from due to a less productive workforce, hurt 
business by reducing workforce efficiency, disincentivize investment and tourism, and 
lower school achievement through stunting cognitive development ("Malaria control: the 
power of integrated action" 2014; Mouzin et al 2011; Suarez and Bradford 1993; Lorntz 
et al 2006; Monaghan et al 2008; Price-Smith 2008; Asenso-Okyere 2011). By reducing 
disease burdens, states theoretically can overcome these hurdles to development.  
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 While macro-level studies remain inconclusive about health aid impacts, studies 
examining specific aid projects have found notable impacts of health aid. Demombynes 
and Trommlerova (2012) examine declines in infant mortality rates using demographic 
and health survey data in Kenya. They find that substantial declines in infant mortality 
are largely explained by uptakes of anti-malaria bed nets, which have been funded by 
foreign donors including the Gates Foundation, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria, among others. Additionally, in a longitudinal study of 3500 
Kenyan children, Fegan et al (2007) found that using insecticide-treated bed nets reduced 
mortality risk by forty-four percent.  
 While the most optimistic accounts of aid projects come from the project-level, it 
is misleading to suggest that all aid projects are successful. For example, the Roll Back 
Malaria (RBM) Partnership was launched in 1998 as a way to provide a coordinated 
response against malaria ("RBM Mandate" 2014). However, some years after its launch it 
was largely considered a failure, with some arguing that it caused more harm than good. 
In 2005, The Lancet reported that since RBM’s launch malaria rates increased, and the 
“loose association” of organizations of RBM that intended to avoid a strict management 
hierarchy “actually inhibited decision-making and limited accountability” ("Reversing 
the failures of Roll Back Malaria" 2005). The Lancet further noted that “technical advice, 
which should have been WHO’s forte, was ‘inadequate and sometimes conflicting,” and 
that the “administrative turmoil cost lives.” Despite this failure, the Lancet concluded 
that, “the right strategies applied in the right ways can have a profound impact on 
incidence and mortality for malaria.”  
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 While scholars have examined the impact of specific health focused aid projects, 
to date no-peer reviewed study has examined the aggregate impact of health aid within a 
country. Such an analysis provides a middle-ground for macro and project level 
analyses— the broader impacts of health aid within a country can be examined without 
aggregating health and aid measures to a single number as cross-national studies do. 
Finding beneficial impacts from aggregating aid at the sub-national level would give 
evidence to aid not being “less the sum of its parts,” giving less weight to potential 
negative impacts of aid. On the other hand, failing to find beneficial impacts could mean 
two things. First, it may represent a broader failure of health aid at the project level. 
Second, failing to find impacts at the sub-national level would highlight the pathways 
through which aid may have an impact at the project level but, due to negative 
consequences of aid, aggregate impacts may be unnoticeable. For example, Lu et al 
(2010) find that health aid reduces government health spending when examining aid 
impacts on health systems across sub-Saharan Africa, ultimately arguing that health aid 
weakens health systems (also see Farag et al 2009). This suggests that areas that receive 
aid may benefit from foreign donors, but in turn may benefit less from the government. If 
this is true, aid impacts may not be seen.  
 
3. HEALTH AND HEALTH AID IN MALAWI  
3.1 Burden of Disease and Health Infrastructure  
 Malawi remains one of the poorest countries in the world and faces substantial 
health problems. In a nation-wide survey conducted primarily in 2010, the World Bank 
asked respondents to rate on a scale of one to six whether they were among the poorest 
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(one) or richest (six) in the country ("Malawi 2010 - 2011 - Third Integrated Household 
Survey" 2014). 71% of respondents answered one or two. Additionally, respondents were 
asked to rate their health care as less than adequate, adequate, or more than adequate. Out 
of the 56,218 individuals surveyed, 32% rated their health care inadequate, 61% rated 
their health care adequate, and only 7% rated their health care as more than adequate.  
Malaria is one of the most prevalence diseases in Malawi. Out of a population of 
over 15 million, there are an estimated 8 million cases of malaria annually ("President's 
Malaria Initiative Malawi: Malaria Operational Plan FY 2013" 2013). However, while 
the WHO reports that cases of malaria generally increased since the early 2000s, there 
have been notable declines in recent years ("World Malaria Report" 2013). Specifically, 
the WHO reports that malaria incidence has declined from 356 cases per 1,000 people in 
2006 to 325 cases in 2011 ("Malawi: Country Cooperation Strategy" 2013). Additionally, 
while Malawi faces among the highest rates of HIV in the world, HIV prevalence has 
consistently decreased since the 2000s. UNAIDs reports that HIV prevalence among 15 
to 49 year olds decreased from 15.8% in 2000 to 10.8% in 2012 (“World Overview” 
2014). Furthermore, the World Bank reports consistent declines in infant mortality rates. 
Since 2000, infant mortality rates have decreased by nearly 60%, from 173.9 deaths per 
1,000 individuals to 71.0 deaths in 2012 (World Bank 2014). 
The Malawi government has provided health care free of charge for most of its 
history as an independent nation (Messac 2013). World Bank survey results show a 
strong reliance on public health facilities. Out of a total 9641 people that reported sick in 
a 2010 survey, 58% went to a government health facility, while only about 4% went to a 
private health clinic (see Figure 1). However, growing financial constraints have  
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Figure 1. Action Taken for Illness 
 
 
Data from the World Bank’s Integrated Survey on Agriculture 
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shortages of drugs and medical supplies have caused numbers of health professionals to 
find better opportunities abroad (Record and Mohiddin 2006). Its healthcare system faces 
an estimated shortfall of 160,000 health workers, and fewer than 4000 doctors, nurses, 
and midwives serve the entire population (Mangham 2007; Hall 2010). There is a total 
vacancy rate of 33% for medical professionals, with a 64% vacancy rate for nurses. To 
make up for health worker shortages, Malawi has used less qualified health workers, 
called “health surveillance assistants,” to carry out tasks usually handled by physicians. 
To combat the brain drain problem, Malawi launched an Emergency Human Resources 
Plan in 2004 ("Malawi's Emergency Human Resources Programme" 2008). As a result of 
the program, medical training capacity has expanded, however health professional 
shortages still remain significant.  
Inefficient health systems may partly result from poor governance. In 2013, the 
Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting reported that political leaders use healthcare to 
demonstrate benevolence, even when health facilities are under-par (Messac 2013). The 
Pulitzer Center reports one citizen saying that: 
“The politicians say that everything is in place. But the people go and find that not 
everything is in place. The quality of care is not what they were told. So the health 
sector is where the politicians play a lot of their games.” 
In 2013, Health Minister Catherine Gotani Hare admitted that Malawi’s central drug 
warehouse only had 5% of medicines that the ministry deemed essential (Messac 2013). 
Theft by pharmacists and officials is cited as a major reason for medicine stock-outs. 
Clinicians have noted that long hours and low pay have led them to steal medicines as a 
means to make more money (Messac 2013).  
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 Data from the 2010 World Bank survey highlights how poor health conditions are 
related to poverty levels (see Table 1), highlighting, as Shah (2013) argues, how disease 
and poverty are linked. On average, the wealthiest were able to spend over four times as 
much as the poorest. Additionally, 20% of the poorest individuals reported being sick, 
while only 7% of the wealthiest reported being sick. Interestingly, the average number of 
days individuals stopped normal activities due to illness appeared higher for the 
wealthiest. One explanation for this is that the poor are less able to afford taking days off, 
and are more likely to “tough it out” and work.  
 
 
Table 1. Poverty and Health Conditions. 
Poverty Level Amount Spent on 
Illness 
Disease 
Prevalence 
Average 
Days Lost 
if Sick 
Health 
Care 
Quality 
1 (Most Poor) 
 
18.21 
(180.93) 
0.203 
(0.402) 
3.28 
(3.74) 
1.68 
(0.58) 
2 15.20 
(210.15) 
0.170 
(0.376) 
2.93 
(3.45) 
1.75 
(0.58) 
3 21.25 
(348.64) 
0.151 
(0.358) 
2.52 
(3.26) 
1.81 
(0.57) 
4 58.08 
(1147.49) 
0.131 
(0.337) 
2.71 
(3.38) 
1.93 
(0.52) 
5 40.06 
(541.38) 
0.135 
(0.342) 
3.27 
(4.00) 
2.07 
(0.45) 
6 (Most Wealthy) 83.46 
(611.76) 
0.071 
(0.258) 
4.33 
(4.69) 
2.10 
(0.53) 
Average reported with standard deviation in parentheses. Data from the World Bank’s 
Integrated Survey on Agriculture 
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3.2 Foreign Health Aid in Malawi 
If donors say this is not democracy, to hell with you… yes, I’m using that word, tell them 
to go to hell. 
—Former President Bingu wa Mutharika 2012 
 
The donors have not walked away for the first time. They come and go and come and go 
but we are here, we did not die. Sometimes when these things happen, you grow up, you 
find other ways. We must become creative, we are not going to be dependent forever. 
Perhaps this is a golden opportunity for us. If we do certain things right and if we are as 
determined as we are as I sit here, in 10 years’ time the donors shall be our partners, not 
our providers, and we shall have weaned ourselves from budget support. 
—President Joyce Banda, 2013 
 
 Malawi has been dependent on foreign aid since it gained independence roughly 
fifty years ago (Tew 2008). Government revenues in 2006/07 were $990 million, $407 
million of which came from foreign donors, which amounts to over forty percent of 
government spending coming from donors. Malawi’s Aid Management Platform (AMP) 
reports Malawi receiving over $147 million in health aid since 2004, with health aid 
coming in a variety of forms and donors emphasizing different purposes. For example, in 
2006 the World Bank gave $33.8 million towards an education sector project, which 
included health-sector focused goals of nutrition and food hygiene education, malaria 
control efforts, and helminthiasis control (Tierney et al 2011). The Norwegian Agency 
for International Cooperation (NORAD) consistently gives towards the health sector. In 
2008 NORAD gave $9.7 million towards medical education and training, in 2009 gave 
$1.8 million towards providing medical equipment and supplies and providing support to 
clinics and hospitals, and in 2010 they gave $3.6 million towards developing basic health 
care infrastructure. Distribution of aid by year, purpose, and donors is reported in Figures 
2 to 4 below and Tables 9 to 12 in Appendix.  
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Figure 2. Total Health Aid by Year.  
 
 
Figure 3. Type of Health Aid, by Purpose and Activity Coded Health Aid. 
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Figure 4. Total Health Aid by Donor 
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sound economic growth and encouraged donor support (Wroe 2012). However, his 
second term was plagued by corruption as he tried to consolidate power. In 2009 
Mutharika used $12.9 million of public funds to buy a personal jet, which in turn caused 
the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID) to withhold 
$4.8 million in foreign aid. In 2011 the European Union and DfID threatened to 
permanently end budgetary support if the government failed to address its concerns about 
unconstitutional behavior (Wroe 2012). The British High Commissioner, Fergus 
Cochrane-Dyet, highlighted worsening governance conditions, when a leaked cable 
reported him saying that Mutharika was “becoming ever more autocratic and intolerant of 
criticism” ("Malawi expels British," 2011). This caused the Malawi government to expel 
Cochrane-Dyet, which in turn caused Britain to choose not to renew a six-year funding 
commitment (Malawi: UK aid,” 2011). Later in 2012 Mutharika told donors to “go to 
hell” after he heard (later disputed) reports that donors were working with NGOs to hold 
demonstrations against his rule ("Malawi's President Mutharika," 2012).  
 Poor governance and corruption during Mutharika’s second term enraged civil 
society organizations, where one of their specific concerns was the impasse with foreign 
donors that Mutharika was creating. On July 20, 2011, protestors took to the streets, only 
to be met by armed government police, and eventually the army itself. This skirmish 
ended with the death of 19 people and upwards of 500 arrests (Mpaka 2011). Donors 
reacted harshly. Malawi’s three largest donors, DfID, the EU, and USAID threatened to 
suspend aid indefinitely. The United States directly cited the violence as reason to 
withhold a $343.65 million aid package ("Us suspends aid," 2011).  
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 The latest corruption scandal occurred in what was dubbed as the “cashgate” 
scandal. Here, upwards of eighty-one people were arrested for siphoning off up to $100 
million in public funds for personal use (Dionne 2014). This raised serious questions of 
whether aid funds were used effectively, causing Britain, Norway, the EU, and others to 
withhold $150 million in aid from the Malawian government. Corruption scandals during 
Mutharika’s second term caused funding to increasingly be given to NGOs rather than 
the government itself (Farrell 2012).  In addition, poor governance and corruption have 
exacerbated poor health conditions. The cashgate scandal and its resulting financial 
consequences caused delays in payments to public health workers, sparking strikes 
throughout the country at public health facilities ("Government corruption “cripples” 
Malawi's health sector" 2013). 
 Mutharika’s successor, current President Joyce Banda, came into office in 2012 
and has made a concerted effort to shore up corruption and distance herself from 
Mutharika’s policies. This has led to increased trust among donors, leading to a number 
of donors increasing funds. The African Development Bank alone pledged $45 million in 
aid to help Banda revive the weak economy (Baldauf 2012). 
 In light of poor governance and corruption donors have expressed a lack of 
confidence about the effectiveness of health aid specifically. For example, the Center for 
Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) reports that in 2010, “the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, TB and Malaria rejected Malawi’s application, which amounted to some $565 
million, due in part to concerns about Malawi’s capacity to implement the programs and 
its management of commodities” (Fleischman 2011). In addition, Norway’s audit report 
of health aid to Malawi expresses concerns over the ineffective use of health aid ("Office 
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of the Auditor General's investigation of Norwegian development aid to the health sector 
in Malawi" 2013). Their main findings indicate that while “development in Malawi has 
had a positive impact on maternal and child health and access to basic health care 
services, [the] key goal of reducing mortality and strengthening the health system has not 
been attained.”  In particular, they note “a high degree of inefficiency in resource flows to 
hospitals and health centres in Malawi, which, among other things, translates into loss of 
medicines and lower availability of health personnel.” They note that this results in the 
“population receiving considerably fewer benefits for the funds allocated to health 
purposes than what could have been the case.” In addition, they highlight a lack of 
transparency, where in some cases no explanation is given for how funds are used.   
 While donors like Norway highlight inefficiencies and minimal aid impacts, other 
donors tell a different story. The UK’s DfID notes deteriorating health conditions up until 
the mid 2000s, when donors began investing more heavily into improving health 
conditions. DfID’s audit report of aid to Malawi attributes improvements in health 
services and health conditions to donor investments ("Department for International 
Development: Aid to Malawi" 2009). In particular, to combat Malawi’s brain drain, DfID 
helped to subsidize the wages of medical professionals, which has helped to cut the 
numbers leaving by over 50 percent (Hall 2010). This was part of Malawi’s Emergency 
Human Resources Programme (EHRP), which the Malawi government reports has saved 
nearly 13,000 lives ("Malawi's Emergency Human Resources Programme" 2008; 
Mweninguwe 2012). In addition, praise for health aid goes beyond DfID. The director of 
the Malawi Health Equity Network, Martha Kwataine, praised investments from USAID 
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in enabling her organization to help reopen maternity wards, staff clinics, and ultimately 
provide upwards of 10,000 people access to basic health services (Kwataine 2013).  
 Additionally, the beneficial impacts of health aid can be seen from the affects of 
reductions in aid funds. Funding cuts heightened drug shortages and stock-outs, as well 
as exacerbated other health challenges (Malawi: UK aid,” 2011). Chief Kwataine, who 
oversees the district Ntcheu in central Malawi, said that “[The cuts] will really make a 
difference because we don’t have the means to buy most drugs ourselves” (Martin 2013). 
Indeed, Malawi heavily relies on donor support for medicines and health supplies. 
Foreign aid covers about 90% of the costs of medicines in Malawi, and anti-retrovirals 
are provided entirely by foreign donors (Malawi: UK aid,” 2011). 
 Different accounts of aid effectiveness highlight how the overall impact of health 
aid within Malawi is not clear. Norway’s audit report of health aid emphasizes concerns 
about the ineffective use of foreign aid funds, and donors have halted funding due to 
corruption and poor governance. However, DfID’s audit report emphasizes improving 
health conditions as a result of foreign aid, and both NGO leaders and government 
officials in Malawi praise the impact of foreign health aid. Furthermore, poor governance 
and corruption highlight the possibility that patronage has influenced aid allocation, 
which raises questions as to whether health aid has been directed to those most in need, 
and, more generally, how aid funds have been managed. To provide further insight of 
health aid in Malawi, and of the broader aid effectiveness debate, I empirically examine 
the allocation and overall impact of health aid in Malawi in the sections that follow.  
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4. DATA 
Shedding light on the geographic dimension of aid can have a powerful and catalytic 
effect on the impact of development. 
—AidData Co-Executive Director Nancy Choi, 2014 
 
 It is possible to examine aid at the sub-national level due to efforts of the AidData 
Center for Development Policy in geocoding aid projects. AidData, in partnership with 
Malawi’s Ministry of Finance, produced the first fully geocoded dataset of aid projects 
for a specific country (Tierney et al 2011). Health and control variables primarily come 
from the Living Standards Measurement Study – Integrated Surveys on Agriculture 
(LSMS-ISA) dataset ("Integrated Household Survey 2010-2011" 2012). This is a $19 
million dollar survey project funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which 
conducts surveys across seven countries throughout multiple years. I utilize Malawi’s 
Third Integrated Household Survey, which collected data from March 2010 to 2011. 
12,271 households were included in the survey, representing 56,218 individuals (for full 
descriptions of all variables, see Table 15 in Appendix). According to a report by 
Malawi’s National Statistical Office, the survey was designed, “to	  be	  representative	  at	  both	  national,	  district,	  urban	  and	  rural	  levels	  enabling	  the	  provision	  of	  reliable	  estimates	  for	  these	  levels”	  ("Integrated Household Survey 2010-2011" 2012). 
 
Foreign Health Aid 
 Malawi’s geocoded data come from its Aid Management Platform (AMP), which 
was implemented in 2008 as a way to better collect and organize aid flow information 
(Petras 2009). The dataset includes projects from 30 donor agencies, representing $5.3 
billion in aid commitments (Tierney et al 2011). Additionally, the data represent about 
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80% of external aid reported to the Malawi Ministry of Finance since 2000. Aid 
disbursement data are collected on a monthly basis, and donors are asked to validate the 
data.  
 While geocoding much of the data from Malawi’s AMP provides a significant 
step towards improved aid transparency, the data are not without its setbacks. Historical 
data prior to the implementation of the AMP are included; however, data prior to 
implementation are considered incomplete (Petras 2009). Additionally, Malawi’s AMP 
data does not include donors that do not have an office in Malawi. This is because aid 
reports are obtained from in-country staff of donor agencies that have a presence in 
Malawi. Donors not present represent about 10% of total aid. Furthermore, AMP data 
excludes aid projects implemented by NGOs. NGOs are not directly accountable to the 
government, and therefore are not required to report data. However, NGO data are 
captured if a donor that reports to the AMP funds the NGO.  
 Knowledge of aid flows is also limited by donor transparency. A number of non-
Western governments have increasingly given foreign aid, however do not report official 
aid flows. Such donors include Saudi Arabia, China, Iran, and Venezuela ("Tracking 
Chinese Development Finance to Africa" 2014). To start to track underreported aid 
flows, AidData has compiled a database of Chinese aid flows by examining media reports 
of aid projects. This database reports 23 aid projects from China to Malawi, given from 
2005 to 2012. However, only one aid project was designated as health aid, with an 
undetermined financial value. Therefore, not including Chinese aid will likely not skew 
results. However, information on other non-Western donors is not available and therefore 
how these undisclosed aid sources skew analyses cannot be assessed.  
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AidData categorizes the type of aid by a purpose and activity code scheme 
("AidData's User Guide: Version 2.0" 2011). Purpose codes designate the primary 
purpose of the aid project, while activity codes designate specific activities of aid 
projects. I create aid variables according to two definitions of health aid: one limited to 
aid projects with a health purpose code (purpose codes starting with “12”), and health aid 
variables that include projects with either health purpose or activity codes. Creating 
health aid variables that only include projects with a health-related purpose code keeps 
the focus on projects specifically designed to improve health outcomes. However, 
“purpose and activity coded” health aid variables include projects not directly intended to 
improve health but which may also have an impact.4  
Additionally, I distinguish aid by year. I include aid in 2010, 2009, 2008, and 
before 2008. Dates are defined as years that aid projects where expected to be completed. 
I limit analyzing aid up to 2010 to match LSMS-ISA data, which was collected from 
March 2010 to March 2011. Additionally, I lump before 2008 data together because 
AMP data before 2008 are incomplete and are more scarce.  
I also consider the precision code of aid projects. Precision codes reference 
whether aid was given to specific locations (specified by an exact latitude and longitude) 
or to larger administrative areas. Foreign health aid projects included three precision 
codes, aid to an exact location (a “1” precision code), aid to an exact location but with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Activity codes often refer to activities that are different from the specific purpose. For example, an aid 
project with the purpose of improving sanitation would be designated with a “water supply and sanitation” 
purpose code. However, such a project may include a health activity code if the project references 
improving health outcomes.	  For example, the United Kingdom DfID highlights how projects in other 
sectors, especially water and sanitation projects, have direct health impacts ("Department for International 
Development: Aid to Malawi" 2009).	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uncertainty of exactly where (a “2” precision code), and aid given to a district (a “3” 
precision code).5  
For aid given to an exact location, theory does not indicate how far the aid project 
has an impact. Because I cannot conclusively determine the distance, on average, that aid 
has an impact I examine aid at three different “aid impact zones”. I create buffers around 
aid given to an exact location (aid with precision codes 1 and 2) using three different 
radii: 5 miles, 10 miles, and 15 miles. Aid projects with a “2” precision code are 
considered as if they are coded as “1.” This doesn’t account for the uncertainty of where 
precision coded “2” projects actually went; however, out of 189 precision codes, only 
four were coded with “2.” Therefore, this should not skew the results.  
Ultimately, I combine district-level and point-location aid projects together for 
each year. This creates final health aid variables that delineate areas in Malawi that 
received aid. The percentages of individuals from the LSMS-ISA dataset that were in 
areas that received aid are reported in Tables 2 and 3, according to different years, the 
two variations of health aid, and the three different aid impact zones for point-location 
aid.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Health	  projects	  in	  the	  Aid	  Malawi Aid Management Platform dataset include three 
According to the AidData geocoding codebook, the three precision codes are defined as: 
1 = The coordinates corresponds to an exact location, such as a populated place or a hill. 
2 = The location is mentioned in the source as being “near”, in the “area” of, or up to 25 km away from an 
exact location. The coordinates refer to that adjacent, exact, location. 
3 = The location is, or is analogous to, a second order administrative division (ADM2), such as a district, 
municipality or commune. 
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Table 2. Percentage of people in training data that were in an area that received purpose 
code foreign health aid.  
 Before 2008 2008 2009 2010 
5-mile radius 13.2% 37.6% 6.9% 60.1% 
10-mile radius 19.2% 44.0% 8.8% 62.2% 
15-mile radius 24.4% 51.6% 10.9% 64.7% 
 
Table 3. Percentage of people in training data that were in an area that received purpose 
and activity code foreign health aid.  
 Before 2008 2008 2009 2010 
5-mile radius 14.3% 47.0% 78.6% 79.8% 
10-mile radius 20.1% 53.0% 84.0% 81.8% 
15-mile radius 26.4% 59.6% 90.0% 83.5% 
 
Additionally, in all analyses I use foreign aid as a binary variable. There are 
drawbacks to examining aid as a binary in lieu of considering aid amounts. In particular, 
questions regarding why areas receive more aid than others cannot be examined. 
However, I use a binary variable to keep aid variables consistent across analyses. In 
section 5.3, which examines the causal impacts of aid, propensity scores developed to 
compare individuals who did and did not receive aid come from logistic regressions, 
which require that aid be a binary variable. Therefore, to confidently compare results 
across empirical analyses, I keep aid variables the same.  
 
Disease Incidence 
 
 Disease incidence data comes from the LSMS-ISA, and measures whether a 
person suffered an illness or injury in the two weeks prior to being surveyed. Disease 
incidence serves as the dependent variable in aid impact models and a control variable in 
allocation models. Effective foreign aid would predict that aid reduces disease incidence, 
and that aid goes to places with higher disease burdens.  
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 Another variable in the LSMS-ISA data that could have been used to measure 
health conditions is “disease severity,” or the number of days a person had to stop normal 
activities because they were sick.6 However, I use disease prevalence because foreign 
health aid generally seeks to reduce disease burdens or eliminate cases of disease, rather 
than reduce the disease burden on people once they are sick. For example, programs to 
distribute bed nets to combat malaria intend to prevent people from contracting malaria, 
versus alleviating the burden once they contract the disease ("Insecticide-Treated Bed 
Nets" 2014).  
 
Health Care Quality and Accessibility 
 
 Health care quality data comes from the LSMS-ISA. Surveyors asked respondents 
to rate their health care quality on a scale from one to three (one for health care quality 
being less than adequate, and three for more than adequate). Health care quality is 
predicted to be associated with less disease, and effective aid allocation would suggest 
aid going to places with worse health care. 
 Additionally, I include a variable that measures distance from a health facility. 
Due to low financial resources, people often struggle to afford transportations costs to get 
to health centers (Messac 2013; Kwataine 2013). Fuel scarcities have compounded the 
difficulties in traveling long distances to health clinics (Kwataine 2013). Therefore, less 
accessibility may be associated with increased disease burdens and a greater need for 
health aid. Clinic location data comes from the Malawi Ministry of Health, and I measure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  A similar paper by De (2013) uses ‘disease severity’ as an indicator for health conditions. See: De 
Rajlakshmi, "Foreign Aid Allocation and Impact: A Sub-National Analysis of Malawi," Duke University 
(2013), https://econ.duke.edu/uploads/media_items/raj-de-dje-aid.original.pdf. 
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the Euclidian distance (in kilometers) from health facilities ("Health Facilities - Ministry 
of Health" 2013).  
 
Population 
 
 Studies of aid allocation and impact typically include a population variable. Less 
populated areas tend to have greater need; however providing aid to less populated areas 
may be more costly (Pietschmann 2014). This is true of Malawi, where 14% are 
considered poor7 in urban areas, while 43% are considered poor in rural areas (Mussa and 
Pauw 2011). Therefore, population levels could influence both aid allocation and risk of 
disease. I test two population variables: distance to a population center and population 
density. Distance to a population center comes from the LSMS-ISA dataset, and 
measures the distance in kilometers to a population center of over 20,000 people. 
Population density comes from the Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network, and is the population per square kilometer (Center for International Earth 
Science Information Network 2011). To simplify interpretation, I convert the unit of 
analysis to 100 people per sq. kilometer.8 Because theory does not suggest which 
population variable is better to include, I test both variables.    
 
Poverty Levels 
 
 Poverty levels could affect both aid allocation and health outcomes. Individuals 
with fewer resources may be at greater risk of being sick. Therefore, health aid may go to 
individuals with fewer resources. Two variables from the LSMS-ISA dataset measure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Mussa and Pauw (2011) define ‘poor’ as being under the poverty line of making US$575 per year. 8	  This is done because increasing population density by one person likely will have very small estimators.	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poverty. The first is a ‘poverty level’ variable, which asks respondents to rate their 
income on a scale of one to five — one being income allowing the individual to build 
their savings, and five being insufficient income and the person needing to borrow to 
meet expenses. The second is a ‘wealth perception’ variable, where individuals are asked 
to rate on a scale from one to six whether they are among the poorest or richest in the 
country (one being poor and six being rich). Both variables measure poverty or financial 
status; however, theory does indicate which variable would better fit the data. Therefore, 
I test both variables.  
 
Presidential Ethnic Match 
 
To account for potential ethnic patronage, I create a ‘Presidential Ethnic Match’ 
variable, which indicates whether a person lives in an area that is dominantly of the 
Lomwe ethnic group, which is the ethnic group of former president Bingu wa Mutharika 
(see Figure 13 in the appendix to see where Lomwe individuals are located in Malawi). 
Political patronage has previously shaped the provision of public goods in Malawi (Wild 
and Harris 2012; Cammack and Kanyongolo 2010). In particular, ethnic divisions have 
played a role in Malawi politics. Ethnic divisions became particularly apparent after 
Mutharika’s reelection in 2009. After coming into office, Mutharika gave leaders in his 
ethnic group power throughout all branches and at different levels of government (Nyasa 
Times 2009). Data comes from Malawi’s 2008 census, which reported ethnic group 
prevalence in the 12,567 Enumeration Areas across Malawi ("Population and Housing 
Census" 2008). Mutharika’s presidency (from 2004 to 2012) spans the data used (the 
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earliest reported aid flow occurs in 2004). Therefore, this variable is appropriate to test 
for all years.  
 
 
Environmental Risk Factors 
 
 Environmental factors influence the risk of contracting an illness. This is 
especially so with malaria, which is the most prevalent disease reported in the LSMS-ISA 
dataset (see Table 8 in appendix). Malaria risk has been shown to be particularly 
associated with elevation, temperature, and rainfall (Kazembe et al 2006; Lowe, 
Chirombo, and Tompkins 2013). Following these results, I include elevation, 
temperature, and rainfall estimates, which are included in the LSMS-ISA data. Higher 
temperatures and precipitation and lower elevations are associated with higher incidences 
of Malaria (Kazembe et. al 2006; Odongo-Aginya, Ssegwanyi, and Vuzi 2005). In 
addition, I include the variables as quadratics to account for nonlinear relationships. For 
example, while higher temperatures are associated with more active malaria vectors, too 
high of temperatures could prove harmful to malaria vectors (Kazembe et. al 2006). 
Environmental factors influence disease incidence and could also influence aid 
allocation, as health aid may go to areas more at risk for malaria. The dataset reports 
temperature in units of 0.1 0C, and to simplify interpretation for other variables I convert 
elevation to units of 10 m and precipitation to 10 mm.9   
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  This was done by dividing original variables by 10.	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5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 I empirically estimate the determinants of aid allocation and disease prevalence, 
as well as estimate the causal impact of health aid on health outcomes. First, I use AIC 
model averaging to examine which factors drive aid allocation. Second, I use the same 
approach to examine which factors explain health outcomes.  Here I ask how important 
foreign health aid is relative to other variables. Third, I bring analyses of aid allocation 
and aid impact together. I use propensity-matching methods to examine the causal impact 
of foreign health aid on disease incidence, using allocation models to develop propensity 
scores. 
All analyses involve prediction, whether it is predicting health outcomes or aid 
allocation. Therefore, validating the models is especially important. For all analyses, I 
randomly select 90% of the data as training data, leaving the remaining 10% for external 
model validation. With a total of 56,218 data points, this leaves 50,596 in the training 
dataset and 5,622 in the testing dataset. I conduct both internal and external validation of 
models. For external validation, I examine how well models developed from the training 
dataset explain actual values in the testing dataset. I conduct simple regressions with 
actual and predicted values, examining the r-squared value. I conduct internal validation 
using the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC). ROC areas 
measure the ability of a model to classify people into distinct groups (Fawcett 2005). A 
ROC value of 0.5 indicates that the model was as good as random assignment (and thus is 
a worthless model), while a ROC value of 1 indicates that the model is perfectly 
predictive.  
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5.1 Aid Allocation: Why Does Aid Go Where it Goes? 
Methods 
 I estimate the determinations of foreign health aid across all years. Here, I ask 
which variables are most important in explaining why foreign aid is given to a specific 
location, and how determinants of aid allocation change throughout time. While all years 
are considered, independent variables from the LSMS-ISA represent 2010 data. While 
some factors considered do not change over the years considered (such as elevation and 
ethnic match with president), others do change (such as such as poverty levels and health 
care quality). Therefore, using data collected in 2010 to explain aid allocation in the past 
is not ideal. However, such social variables likely change slowly overtime, and therefore 
give an approximate indication for conditions in the past.   
 For model selection, I compare models according to their Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) (Burnham and Anderson 1998). AIC measures the quality of a statistical 
model, where it balances goodness of fit and model complexity. The AIC value itself is 
an estimate of the information lost by a model “to approximate the process that generated 
the observed data” (Johnson and Omland 2004). AIC values do not express the absolute 
quality of a model, but are used to compare between other models. The model with the 
lowest AIC value is considered the best model to fit the data (Burnham and Anderson 
1998; Bozdogan 2000). AIC is calculated as:   𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 2𝑃 − 2ln  [𝐿(𝜃!|𝑦] 
where P represents the number of parameters and 𝐿(𝜃!|𝑦) represents the likelihood of the 
model parameters (using the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters) given data 
y (Johnson and Omland 2004). As seen from the equation, AIC penalizes model 
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complexity (including additional variables) and preferences goodness of fit of the model 
(Bozdogan 2000).     
 I conduct model averaging using AIC values to develop final models. Models 
with all possible combinations of variables are considered as candidate models. Then, the 
parameter estimates of the top models (according to their AIC weight) within a 95 
percent confidence set are averaged together using weighted averages based on AIC 
weights . To develop the confidence set, each model is given an AIC weight according to 
the difference in the AIC of the model compared the model with the lowest AIC value 
(Burnham and Anderson 1998, Johnson and Omland 2004). The ‘likelihood’ of a model 
(or, more specifically, the likelihood that a model structure is the correct model structure 
in explaining an outcome) is calculated as: 
𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 = exp  (− 12×∆𝐴𝐼𝐶) 
where ∆𝐴𝐼𝐶 is the difference between the model AIC and the lowest AIC value. Model 
likelihood values are then normalized across all models so they sum to one.10 This is done 
by dividing the individual model likelihood by the sum of all model likelihood models 
(Burnham and Anderson 1998). I create a 95 percent confidence set of models, where I 
calculate a weighted average of all models where the sum of their normalized likelihoods 
adds up to 95. From this, variables importance can be denoted by the sum of normalized 
likelihoods of the models they are in. For example, if a variable is included in all models 
in the 95 percent confidence set, it will have an AIC likelihood of one.11  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Normalized likelihood values also serve as weights for creating final models, as final models are created 
through taking a weighted average of all models in the 95 percent confidence set.  11	  Making a 95 percent confidence set means that if a variable is included in all models in the set, it 
technically will have a normalized likelihood of .95. However, I adjust weights in the 95 percent 
confidence set so they sum to one. Not adjusting likelihoods to equal one would lower estimator values.	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Model averaging was developed to address the uncertainty inherent in model 
selection (Burnham and Anderson 1998). While researchers virtually always address 
uncertainty of estimators through standard errors, uncertainty of estimator values through 
model structure often goes unaddressed (Bartels 1997; Burnham and Anderson 1998; 
Moral-Benito 2013; Hoeting et al. 1999; Jackson, Thompson, and Sharples 2008; 
Montgomery and Nyhan 2010). Figures 14 and 15 highlight how estimator values change 
as the model structure changes.    
Model averaging is suggested when (1) theory is underdeveloped and provides 
little guidance for model selection and (2) when a number of models could be regarded as 
a potential hypothesis of the true model (Moral-Benito 2011; Moral-Benito 2013). Both 
of these conditions fit aid allocation and impact at the sub-national level, as such analysis 
have only recently started to be examined. The model averaging approach views each 
model structure as a hypothesis for explaining an outcome. Here, all possible 
combinations of independent variables could be viewed as hypothesis. For example, 
donors giving health aid may respond strongly to poor health care quality while poverty 
variables may not be as important. Therefore, this model structure would exclude poverty 
variables. Furthermore, environmental variables may prove insignificant as donors 
respond to social and health variables rather than where there is a higher environmental 
risk for disease. Additionally, governments may disregard socio-economic conditions and 
allocate aid strictly to political factors. Further hypotheses are theoretically justified by 
considering constraints governments may face in allocated according to socio-economic 
conditions (Piva and Dodd 2009). Therefore, allowing all possible models to compete is 
justified as all possible model structures are theoretically defensible.  
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Six final models are developed for each year, which comes from examining the 
two different versions of foreign health aid at three different aid impact zones. Because 
the dependent variable is binary (an individual being in an area that received health aid or 
not), all models are developed from logistic regressions. I run all possible combinations 
of control variables on each dependent aid variable. However, I exclude some variables 
from being in the same model. First, I exclude variables that measure similar factors from 
being in the same model (such as the poverty level and wealth perception, and distance to 
a population center and population density). Second, I exclude variables that are highly 
correlated to avoid issues of multicollinearity. Temperature and elevation highly correlate 
(r = 0.9), and thus are excluded from being in the same model (see Table 14 in 
Appendix).  
 While the above variable combinations cannot be in the same model, I also 
exclude them from being weighted together. I keep the variables included in the best 
models. For instance, if poverty level (rather than wealth perception) appears in the best 
model, I eliminate all models with wealth perception in them. Results are presented in 
Figure 5 along with model diagnostics in Figure 6 (in addition, see Tables 16 to 21 in 
appendix).  
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Figure 5. Aid Allocation. Percentage change in odds of receiving aid reported for each 
variable. AIC weights reported in bar graphs.  
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                                     Figure 6. Internal Model Validation 
 
 
 
                                     Figure 7. External Model Validation 
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Results 
 Internal and external validation overall shows models to be predictive. Models for 
before 2008 aid appear the most predictive, having ROC values > 0.9 and r-squared of 
regressions between actual versus predictive values > 0.7. 2010 aid had the lowest values, 
but still showed the model to be relatively predictive. Here, ROC  values are between 0.7 
and 0.8, and r-squared of regressions between actual versus predictive values between 0.1 
and 0.3, which suggests decently strong models. Models may have been particularly 
strong for before 2008 because all aid was precision coded at a specific area, meaning 
there was no district level aid. Aid projects covering smaller geographic areas decreases 
the chance that people were in areas that received aid but did not benefit. Therefore, 
having no district level aid projects may have improved model validation measures. 
However, models with district-level aid still appear predictive (see Figures 6 and 7 for 
mode validation summaries).  
 Results are mixed as to whether aid was allocated to areas with the worst health 
conditions. Overall, aid was generally not allocated to places with higher disease burdens.  
In 2010 disease burdens was a relatively unimportant variable, but in 2008 and 2009 
being sick was associated with about a 10 - 20% reduction in odds of receiving aid. 
However, effective aid allocation is generally seen when examining health care quality 
from 2008 to 2010, but to varying degrees. Worse health care quality was associated with 
receiving more aid, with the magnitude of the estimator and AIC weights growing over 
time. In 2010, a one unit decrease in health care quality (for example, from adequate to 
inadequate) is associated with about 30% increase in odds of receiving aid for purpose 
coded aid and about fifty percent greater odds of receiving purpose and activity coded 
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aid. However, a one unit decrease in 2008 corresponds to  ≤ 2% increase in odds of 
receiving purpose coded aid and 6% increase in odds of receiving purpose and activity 
coded aid. In addition, in 2010 health care quality has AIC weights of one (for both 
variations of health aid), while AIC weights drop to as low as 0.26 in 2008.   
Analyses show that aid was generally not allocated to the poorest individuals. For 
purpose coded aid, only in 2010 was increased poverty associated with receiving more 
aid, while for purpose and activity coded aid only in 2009 was increased poverty 
associated with receiving more aid. In other years, a one-unit increase in wealth 
perception or a one-unit decrease in poverty level was associated with 10 – 40% increase 
in odds of receiving aid, depending on year and aid impact zone.  
Increases in distances to health facilities are generally associated with receiving 
less aid, which suggests that aid projects may not go to more rural or hard to reach areas. 
This result corroborates with how population acts as a determinant of aid. Results 
generally show that higher populations or being closer to a population center are 
associated with receiving more aid. The only year that breaks this trend is purpose and 
activity coded aid in 2010. Additionally, for purpose coded aid the estimator on Distance 
to Population Center decreases over time. Before 2008, a one-kilometer increase in 
distance to a population center is associated with about 15% reduction in odds of 
receiving aid. However, in 2010 a one-kilometer increase is associated with only about 
2.5% reduction in odds of receiving aid. This suggests that, over time, purpose coded 
health aid increasingly was directed to relatively less populated areas.  
Environmental health risk factors are consistently important variables with AIC 
weights of one. Most years show increased environmental risk associated with more 
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health aid in terms of elevation/ temperature, precipitation, or both. Additionally, like 
with many variables, allocation differs over time. Purpose coded aid shows that before 
2010, higher elevations were associated with receiving more aid, meaning that areas less 
at risk for malaria received more aid. However, in 2010 areas with higher temperatures 
(and at a greater risk for malaria) were more likely to receive purpose coded aid. While 
purpose coded aid shows that only in 2010 was aid was allocated to individuals more at 
risk for malaria (in terms of elevation/ temperature), purpose and activity coded aid 
shows effective allocation in 2010, 2009, and before 2008. Additionally, increased 
precipitation (meaning greater risk for disease) was generally associated with receiving 
more aid for all years except 2010.  
Differences in aid allocation across years could be explained by different aid 
projects being more needed in certain areas. For example, only in 2010 did purpose coded 
aid go to places with higher risk of malaria (in terms of temperature/ elevation). Here, 
nearly half of aid flows were a USAID project devoted towards “infectious and parasitic 
disease control” (see Table 10 in appendix). Therefore, it makes sense that aid in this year 
would be allocated to areas with greater malaria risk. Additionally, while 2009 purpose 
coded aid did not go to areas with greatest malaria risk, individuals with worse health 
care had 10 – 20% increase in odds of receiving aid (when considering the five and ten 
mile aid impact zones). This makes sense when examining the type of aid given, as 
nearly half of aid was devoted towards improving basic health infrastructure. However, 
comparing the types of aid projects with how aid was allocated also shows cases where 
aid may not have been allocated effectively. For example, nearly a third of 2008 purpose 
coded aid went towards improving basic health care; however, allocation results show 
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health care quality as a relatively unimportant variable, having AIC weights , 0.3 at the 
five and 10-mi aid impact zone and an AIC weight of 65 at the 15-mi aid impact zone. 
Overall, while results are mixed as to whether aid goes to those with greatest need, results 
do highlight how defining ‘need,’ whether that be low socio-economic status, poor health 
care, or significant risk of disease influences conclusions about effective aid allocation.  
Results show evidence that political factors may have influenced health aid 
allocation in 2010. Purpose-coded aid in 2010 shows individuals in the same ethnic group 
as the president had about 50 – 150% increase in odds of receiving health aid (46% for 5-
mi aid impact zone, 77% for 10-mi aid impact zone, and 153% for 15-mi aid impact 
zone). While results do not show causation, the results suggest that ethnic patronage 
could have played a role after the 2009 election. However, Presidential Ethnic Match was 
associated with receiving less aid in 2010 for purpose and activity-coded aid, which 
weakens this claim. Nevertheless, further examining ethnic patronage in regards to 
foreign aid after the 2009 election could be worthwhile. All other years fail to find 
evidence that Presidential Ethnic Match increased the odds of receiving aid. This 
provides additional evidence for Dietrich’s (2011) claim that health aid may be spared 
from political corruption. 
 Presidential Ethnic Match results also highlight how estimators can be sensitive to 
the extent of the aid impact zone. In some years only the 15-mi aid impact zone shows 
preference for Lomwe groups. This indicates that aid projects were located in areas just 
over 10 mi from a large number of Lomwe people.  
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5.2 Health Outcomes: Is Foreign Health Aid Important?   
Methods  
In this section I examine the determinants of aid outcomes, asking which 
variables influence disease prevalence. Here, the dependent variable is whether a person 
reported being sick or injured in the two weeks prior to being surveyed. As this is a 
binary variable, logistic regressions are used. I develop six separate models, where I 
consider both variations of health aid at the three different aid impact zones. Aid 
variables now are included as independent variables, and I examine the importance of 
foreign health aid relative to other variables.  
The same AIC modeling approach specified in the precious section is used here. 
Again, little theory exists for the impact of health aid at the sub-national level, and all 
combinations of variables could be a justifiable hypothesis. Therefore, utilizing model 
averaging and allowing all possible combinations of models to model is useful and 
justified.  
 The same variables as above are excluded from being in the same model. No 
worrisome correlations are found between foreign aid variables (see Table 14 in 
appendix).  
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Table 4. Determinants of Health Outcomes. ‘P Aid’ refers to purpose coded aid projects 
and ‘P&A Aid’ refers to purpose and activity coded aid projects.  
 Disease Incidence, with aid at 
the 5 mi aid impact zone 
Disease Incidence, with aid 
at the 10 mi aid impact zone 
Disease Incidence, with aid 
at the 15 mi aid impact zone 
 P Aid P&A Aid P Aid P&A Aid P Aid P&A Aid 
Distant to 
Pop. Center 
-0.0062 
(0.00072) 
[1] 
-0.00488 
(0.00064) 
[1] 
-0.0053 
(0.0011) 
[1] 
-0.0047 
(0.00078) 
[1] 
  
Pop. Density     -.0069 
(0.0011) 
[1] 
-0.0071 
(0.0011) 
[1] 
Presidential 
Ethnic Match 
-0.087 
(0.057) 
[0.86] 
-0.078 
(0.064) 
[0.81] 
-0.044 
(0.075) 
[0.61] 
-0.063 
(0.078) 
[0.72] 
-0.085 
(0.064) 
[0.88] 
-0.047 
(0.081) 
[0.64] 
Health Care 
Quality 
-0.17 
(0.020) 
[1] 
-0.16 
(0.021) 
[1] 
-0.17 
(0.021) 
[1] 
-0.17 
(0.012) 
[1] 
-0.18 
(0.021) 
[1] 
-0.18 
(0.021) 
[1] 
Distance to 
Health Center 
-0.0066 
(0.0070) 
[0.736004209] 
-0.0096 
(0.0061) 
[0.88] 
-0.0021 
(0.0088) 
[0.38] 
-0.0039 
(0.012) 
[0.55] 
-0.0013 
(0.0071) 
[0.34] 
-0.0035 
(0.0078) 
[0.51] 
Wealth 
Perception 
-0.13 
(0.014) 
[1] 
-0.14 
(0.015) 
[1] 
-0.14 
(0.015) 
[1] 
-0.15 
(0.0047) 
[1] 
-0.14 
(0.014) 
[1] 
-0.14 
(0.015) 
[1] 
Before 2008 
Health Aid 
-0.19 
(0.050) 
[1] 
-0.18 
(0.052) 
[1] 
-0.051 
(0.077) 
[0.66] 
-0.13 
(0.10) 
[0.98] 
0.23 
(0.027) 
[1] 
0.20 
(0.028) 
[1] 
2008 Health 
Aid 
-0.27 
(0.035) 
[1] 
-0.26 
(0.033) 
[1] 
-0.18 
(0.035) 
[1] 
-0.19 
(0.11) 
[1] 
-0.0056 
(0.041) 
[0.30] 
-0.11 
(0.039) 
[1] 
2009 Health 
Aid 
-0.29 
(0.063) 
[1] 
-0.12 
(0.035) 
[1] 
-0.35 
(0.047) 
[1] 
-0.073 
(0.083) 
[0.85] 
-0.31 
(0.053) 
[1] 
0.021 
(0.016) 
[0.39] 
2010 Health 
Aid 
0.0026 
(0.022) 
[0.27] 
0.10 
(0.034) 
[0.98] 
-0.00048 
(0.037) 
[0.27] 
0.020 
(-0.050) 
[0.45] 
0.10 
(0.027) 
[1] 
0.057 
(0.023) 
[0.76] 
Precipitation -0.0015 
(0.0065) 
[1] 
0.0020 
(0.0032) 
[1] 
-0.0049 
(0.0060) 
[0.86] 
0.0011 
(0.0024) 
[0.91] 
-0.0042 
(0.0073) 
[0.71] 
0.000055 
(0.0052) 
[0.53] 
Precipitation2 0.000013 
(0.0000057) 
[0.54] 
-0.00000088 
(0.000019) 
[0.27] 
0.000022 
(0.0000074) 
[0.67] 
0.00000038 
(0.000020) 
[0.24] 
0.000018 
(0.0000020) 
[0.55] 
0.0000013 
(0.000010) 
[0.15] 
Temperature 0.078 
(0.012) 
[1] 
0.089 
(0.012) 
[1] 
0.088 
(0.010) 
[1] 
0.088 
(0.011) 
[1] 
0.066 
(0.012) 
[1] 
0.069 
(0.016) 
[1] 
Temperature2 -0.00018 
(0.000033) 
[1] 
-0.00021 
(0.000032) 
[1] 
-0.00020 
(0.000037) 
[1] 
-0.00021 
(0.000037) 
[1] 
-0.00015 
(0.000032) 
[1] 
-0.00016 
(0.000026) 
[1] 
Intercept -8.94 
(1.38) 
[1] 
-10.21 
(1.56) 
[1] 
-9.87 
(1.57) 
[1] 
-10.11 
(1.66) 
[1] 
-7.89 
(1.28) 
[1] 
-8.45 
(1.23) 
[1] 
ROC Area 0.5711 0.5699 0.5670 0.5638 0.5667 0.5630 
Act. vs 
Predicted R^2 
0.0066 0.0066 0.0060 0.0060 0.0079 0.0073 
AIC value 46198 46213 46189 46284 46258 46287 
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Results 
Internal and external validation show models to be extremely poor. External 
validation shows that the models only explained 0.6 to 0.7 percent of the data. 
Additionally, ROC values are all < 0.6, which shows the models are not much better than 
random. Therefore, results should be viewed with caution. 
 Despite poor models, one useful insight that can be taken is examining which aid 
impact zone fit the model the best. Internal and external validation offers little insight to 
comparing models because they differ only slightly. However, AIC values show useful 
differences between models.12 Comparing	  delta	  AIC	  values	  shows	  that	  purpose	  coded	  aid	  at	  the	  10-­‐mi	  aid	  impact	  zone	  performed	  best,	  outperforming	  the	  5-­‐mi	  aid	  impact	  zone	  by	  deta	  AIC	  =9	  and	  the	  15-­‐mi	  zone	  by	  delta	  AIC	  =	  70.13	  Purpose	  and	  activity	  coded	  aid	  at	  the	  5-­‐mi	  aid	  impact	  zone	  performed	  best,	  outperforming	  10	  and	  15-­‐mi	  aid	  impact	  zones	  by	  	  delta	  AIC	  =70. 
 Additionally, while the models overall fail at providing a strong prediction of 
disease prevalence, results do correspond for what would be expected to explain disease 
prevalence for a number of variables. A 0.1 Celsius increase (and hence theoretically 
greater risk of malaria) corresponds to 7 – 9% increase in odds of getting sick,  
A one unit increase in health care quality (for example, from inadequate to adequate) 
corresponds to 15 – 16% increase in the odds of getting sick. Additionally, a one-unit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  As opposed to models in other sections, AIC values can be compared here because the dependent 
variable was the same between models. 	  13	  Theory does not indicate when one AIC value is significantly different from another. However, when 
averaging all models within a 95 percent confidence set, generally models within an AIC value of 3 or 4 
were averaged together. Therefore, even an AIC value of 9 does show a notable different in model fit. A 
difference of delta AIC of 70 suggest a strongly improbable model.  
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increase in wealth perception corresponds to about thirteen percent decreased odds of 
getting sick.   
The Lomwe ethnic group (who are in the same ethnic group as the president) 
show a slightly less chance of getting sick. Lomwe peoples have 5 – 8% reduction in 
odds of getting sick relative to the rest of the population. This may help to explain why 
Lomwe groups were less likely to receive foreign health aid. However, Lomwe groups 
being slightly better off could suggest forms of political favoritism beyond health aid that 
improved health outcomes. 
Results show foreign health corresponding to lower disease burdens at the 5 – 10-
mi aid impact zones in all years before 2010. While results only show correlation, this 
provides evidence that health aid could have caused reductions in disease burdens. In 
contrast to this conclusion, at the 15 -mi radius all years but 2008 had instances where 
health aid was associated with greater disease incidence. However, in terms of AIC 
values, models with health aid at the 15-mi aid impact zone were the worst models, 
suggesting greater weight should be given to models with 5 mi and 10-mi aid impact 
zones. To simplify interpretation, I report odds of getting sick of those who received 
health aid compared to those who did not receive aid in Table 5. For example, Table 5 
shows that those who received purpose coded health aid in 2009 had 26 – 29% reduction 
in odds of getting sick than those who did not receive aid.  
Interestingly, 2010 aid largely appears to be associated with increased health 
burdens. One explanation for this could be that aid was given to areas with higher disease 
burdens and aid not having time to have a significant impact. However, allocation models 
from the previous section show disease prevalence to be a relatively unimportant variable 
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in explaining 2010 aid allocation (having AIC weights mostly below 0.30), which 
weights against this hypothesis.  
Beyond examining estimators, useful insight comes from comparing AIC weights 
between variables. AIC weights show health care quality and wealth perception to be 
consistently important, having an AIC weight of one in all models. This makes 
theoretical sense, as both variables are expected to strongly predict health outcomes. 
Distance to Health Center is less important in explaining health outcomes, having AIC 
weights that range from 0.34 to 0.73 (depending on variation of aid an aid impact zone). 
Temperature consistently has AIC weights of one, showing it to be equally as important 
as wealth perception and health care quality. Presidential Ethnic Match appears mildly 
important, having AIC weights ranging from 0.61 to 0.88.  
Overall, health aid appears important, frequently having AIC weights of one or 
near one. This shows that health aid overall is similar in importance to variables like 
health care quality and wealth perception in explaining disease prevalence. However the 
relative importance of health aid does vary over years, impact zone, and variation of 
health aid. 2010 purpose coded aid in particular was one of the least important variables 
across models, having AIC weights of about 0.27 for five and ten mile aid impact zones. 
As also suggested by 2010 health aid generally having positive estimators, this suggests 
that 2010 health aid may not have had sufficient time to impact disease prevalence in 
2010.  
One hypothesis between the two variations of health aid may be that including all 
aid projects that, in some way, impact health conditions would better explain disease 
prevalence. However, results do not provide strong evidence for this. In the majority of 
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instances AIC weights between purpose and activity codes are the same. When they are 
not the same, AIC weights on purpose-coded aid are not consistently higher or lower than 
purpose and activity coded aid. In some instances the estimator on purpose coded aid is 
larger than purpose and activity coded aid, while in other cases the opposite is true.  
Foreign health aid results do not necessarily show that foreign health aid causes 
decreases in health outcomes. The causal arrow could also go the other way. For 
example, negative estimators on health aid variables could suggest higher disease burdens 
being associated with receiving less aid. Indeed, allocation models from the previous 
section provide evidence for this, showing that higher disease burdens were largely 
associated with receiving less aid. Additionally, overall poor models further caution 
against relying on results in this section. To provide clarification, the next section 
examines the causal impact of health aid on disease burdens.  
 
Table 5. Odds of getting sick with respect to health aid. This table reports the odds of 
getting sick of those who received health aid compared to those who did not receive 
health aid, controlling for other factors. For an example of interpretation, this table 
shows that at the 5-mile aid impact zone, the odds of getting sick for those who received 
purpose coded health aid before 2008 were 18% lower than those who did not receive 
aid. “P Aid” refers to purpose coded health aid, while “P&A Aid” refers to purpose and 
activity coded health aid.  
 5-mi aid impact 10-mi aid impact 15-mi aid impact 
 P Aid P&A Aid P Aid P&A Aid P Aid P&A Aid 
Before 2008 -18% -16% -5% -12% 26% 22% 
2008 -23% -23% -16% -18% -0.6% -10% 
2009 -26% -11% -29% -7% -27% 2% 
2010 0.26% 11% -0.05% 2% 11% 5% 
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                          Figure 8. Model AIC Values.  
 
 
5.3 Sub-national Aid Impact 
Methods 
Propensity score matching methods are used to examine causal impacts of 
treatments when randomized experiments are infeasible. Here, logistic regressions predict 
assignment to a treatment given a number of covariates, where the predicted value is 
called the propensity score14 (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Then, outcomes of treated 
and untreated individuals with similar propensity scores are compared. In randomized 
experiments, randomization into control and treatment groups allows treatment affects to 
be compared because the two groups can be assumed to be similar. Without 
randomization, direct comparison is misleading because groups exposed to the treatment 
may differ systematically from the control group due to selection bias. However, 
propensity score matching overcomes selection bias by comparing individuals with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  The dictionary definition of ‘propensity’ is “a strong natural tendency to do something.” So, the 
propensity score can be interpreted as a value indicating the natural tendency of being exposed to a 
treatment. See: Merriam-Webster, "propensity." Last modified 2014. http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/propensity.  
46100	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similar likelihood of receiving treatment. Here, propensity score matching methods are 
used to compare disease incidence between individuals with similar propensity scores 
who do and do not receive foreign health aid for each health aid variable (see Figure 9, 
which highlights examining the relationship between health aid and disease incidence 
through controlling for a number of confounding variables). Propensity scores are 
developed using logistic regressions predicting foreign health aid. An average treatment 
effect is calculated, which is the reduction in disease prevalence due to health aid.  
Propensity scores must be both predictive and have sufficient overlap between 
treated and untreated groups for matching to occur. To meet these requirements, I use two 
steps to choose models used to develop propensity scores. First, following the approach 
in section 5.1 to explain aid allocation, I develop models for all combinations of 
variables, and rank models according to their AIC value. Second, I select the model 
where all treated individuals can be matched with untreated individuals, imposing a 
maximum distance for which propensity scores can be matched. Ensuring sufficient 
overlap forces the models to be less predictive than the models developed in section 5.1, 
as some variables are eliminated from the model. However, choosing the best model that 
meets an established overlap requirement ensures that propensity scores control for the 
most important variables.    
Smith and Todd (2005) and Friedman (2013) highlight how it is difficult a priori 
to know which maximum distance to compare propensity scores is reasonable, and how 
generally there is little theoretical guidance in developing propensity scores. Despite this, 
some literature suggests methods for determining an appropriate maximum distance for 
propensity scores to be matched. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), who developed 
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propensity score matching methods, use a maximum width of 0.25 standard deviations of 
the propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985; Lunt 2013). However, more recent 
literature recommends setting the maximum width to 0.2 of the standard deviations of the 
propensity scores (Austin 2011; Wange et al. 2013). I use the more narrow approach, 
setting the maximum acceptable distance for propensity scores to be matched to 0.2 of 
the standard deviation of the propensity scores. The standard deviation of the predicted 
values of the best model (lowest AIC value) is used to develop the maximum acceptable 
distance. Once the maximum matching distance is calculated, I choose the best model 
that meets this overlap requirement. Treated and untreated individuals are matched to 
minimize the difference in propensity scores. Average treatment affects are reported in 
Table 6, and final logistic models used to develop propensity scores (with treatment 
affects and maximum matching distance) are reported in Table 22 in the appendix.  
Figure 9. Impact of foreign health aid on disease prevalence, with confounding variables.   
Observed difference between foreign health aid and disease prevalence could be due to 
selection and not the treatment itself. To overcome this selection bias, cofounding factors 
that influence both health aid and disease are controlled for through propensity score 
matching.  
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Table 6. Treatment affects of foreign health aid. Table reports the average causal impact 
of health on disease incidence. “P Aid” refers to purpose coded health aid, while “P&A 
Aid” refers to purpose and activity coded health aid.   
 Reduction in Disease 
Incidence, with 5-mile 
aid impact zone. 
Reduction in Disease 
Incidence, with 10-mile 
aid impact zone. 
Reduction in Disease 
Incidence, with 15-
mile aid. 
 P Aid P&A Aid P Aid P&A Aid P Aid P&A Aid 
Before 2008 
Health Aid 
.041 
(.033) 
-.005 
(.014) 
.016 
(.035) 
.042 
(.033) 
.020* 
(.011) 
-.010 
(.049) 
2008 Health 
Aid 
-.024*** 
(.008) 
-.040*** 
(.007) 
-.010 
(.007) 
-.041*** 
(.007) 
-.018* 
(.010) 
-.090*** 
(.024) 
2009 Health 
Aid 
-.014 
(.036) 
-.050*** 
(.012) 
-.040*** 
(.012) 
-.041** 
(.016) 
-.026 
(.052) 
-.026 
(.028) 
2010 Health 
Aid 
-.003 
(.006) 
-.028** 
(.012) 
-.010** 
(.005) 
.005 
(.007) 
-.008 
(.006) 
-.012 
(.008) 
Average treatment effects reported, with standard errors reported in parentheses.  
    * Significant at 10%  
  ** Significant at 5%  
*** Significant at 1% 
 
 
Results 
Models appear predictive, despite some variables being removed to allow for 
sufficient overlap of propensity scores between treated and untreated individuals. R-
squared values from regressing actual and predicted values generally are between 0.1 and 
0.3, with a range of 0.09 to 0.52. In addition, a number of variables shown to be most 
important in predicting aid allocation and health outcomes (see sections 5.1 and 5.2) are 
frequently included in logistic regressions. For example, health care quality, population, 
poverty/wealth, and environmental risk factors are all included in a majority of the 
logistic models (see Table 22 in appendix). This gives confidence that confounding 
variables were sufficiently controlled for, allowing average treatment effect estimates to 
be trusted. 
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Results show that foreign health aid has contributed to a statistically significant 
reduction in disease prevalence since 2008 (using the 95 percent confidence level as the 
cut-off for statistical significance). However, this impact is sensitive to aid impact zones 
and the two definitions of health aid. For example, 2008 purpose and activity coded aid 
significantly reduces disease prevalence with all impact zones, while only 2008 purpose 
coded aid at the five-mile impact zone exhibits an impact.  
Foreign health aid reduced disease burdens by 1 to 9%.15 Among statistically 
significant estimates, the average reduction in disease prevalence resulting from foreign 
aid is four percent. Breaking this down further, the average affect for significant purpose 
coded aid is 2.5% while the average impact for significant purpose and activity coded aid 
is 4.6%. This makes theoretical sense, as considering a larger number of aid projects 
would further reduce disease prevalence if the projects were effective.  
The true impact of foreign health aid can be seen from using average treatment 
effects to estimate the number of incidences of disease reduced and the amount of money 
it cost for each disease reduction. For example, in 2008, 19,030 people (out of the 50,596 
in the sample) were in areas that received purpose coded health aid. A 2.4% reduction in 
disease prevalence among the 19,030 people in areas that received aid corresponds to 456 
people who did not get sick because of foreign health aid. However, extrapolating this 
estimate to the population and the full year allows a more realistic impact to be seen.16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Treatment affects should be interpreted as the difference in disease prevalence between those who 
received aid and those who did not. As disease prevalence is a binary variable, treatment affects can be 
interpreted as percentage differences. For example, purpose code aid reducing disease prevalence by 
“0.024” can be interpreted as health aid reducing disease burdens by 2.4%. In other words, this means that 
areas that revived health aid had 2.4% lower disease burdens as a result of foreign health aid.  16	  Disease prevalence was measured as the number of people sick in a two-week period. Because foreign 
aid is considered by aid given in a certain year, more realistic impacts are seen by extrapolating from the 
two-week period to a year.  
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The World Bank reports that in 2010 Malawi had a population of 15,013,694. In this 
year, 37.6% of people where in areas that received purpose-coded health aid, which 
amounts to 5,646,901 people (World Bank 2014). A 2.4% reduction in disease burdens 
corresponds to an estimated 143580 less cases of disease as a result of foreign health aid. 
$21,722,320.23 was spent on health aid, which means that it cost, on average, $151.29 
per reduction in disease incidence in the two-week period. Further extrapolating the 
estimates from the two-week period to a year’s time brings the amounts to a reduction of 
3,733,080 cases of disease, with an average of $5.82 spent per reduction of illness.17  
However, some problems could occur from extrapolating to the year’s time. The 
LSMS-ISA makes no mention of the generalizability of the two-week period to a year’s 
time. One particular problem could arise from prevalence of disease changing over the 
year. For example, malaria transmission increases during the rainy season (November to 
April). Extrapolating estimates taken from this time period would over-estimate yearly 
estimates. I check how accurate extrapolating from two-weeks to a year is by estimating 
the number of malaria cases seen per year in the whole population using the sample 
LSMS-ISA data and comparing this to the actual number estimated. The survey reported 
4383 people having malaria in a two-week period. Extrapolating this to a year would 
estimate that there were 113,958 cases of malaria among those surveyed in a year. 
Further extrapolating this to the population means that there was an estimated 30,433,856 
cases of malaria per year.18 However, the President’s Malaria Initiative estimates that 
there are about 8 million cases of malaria per year ("President's Malaria Initiative 
Malawi: Malaria Operational Plan FY 2013" 2013). Therefore, the survey data 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Calculated by multiplying number of disease incidences reduced by 26, and dividing cost per disease by 
26.	  	  18	  Calculated by considering that the survey (55218 people) represents 0.374 percent of the population.	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overestimates by a factor of 3.8. To account for this overestimation in reduction in 
disease incidence, I divide the original estimate for reduction in disease incidence by 3.8 
(which then increases cost per disease incidence by a factor of 3.8). Results for all aid 
estimates that significantly reduced disease burdens at the 95% confidence level are 
reported in Table 7.    
Results estimate that purpose coded health aid prevented 926,249 cases of disease 
in 2008, 361,803 cases in 2009, and 637,760 cases of disease in 2010. Purpose and 
activity coded health aid prevented 1.9 million to 5.5 million cases of disease in 2008, 3.5 
million to 4.0 million cases of disease in 2009, and 2.3 million cases of disease in 2010. 
Additionally, results show that the average cost of preventing an incidence of disease was 
$3.97 to $23.45. These results are generally consistent with estimates of the cost-
effectiveness of foreign health interventions. White et al. (2011) review the literature on 
the costs and cost-effectiveness of malaria interventions, analyzing a total of ninety-eight 
studies. They find that the median cost of protecting one person against malaria with 
insecticide-treated nets is $2.20, and protecting with indoor residual spraying is $6.70. 
Additionally, they find that the average cost of treating an uncomplicated case of malaria 
is $5.84 and $30.26 for a severe case of malaria.  
While results generally show foreign health aid to effectively lower disease 
burdens, it is important to note that before 2008 aid was not found to be effective, even 
when it received the most health aid out of all time periods (see Figure 2 in section 3.2). 
A number of reasons could explain this. First, health aid may simply not have been 
effective before 2008. Second, the impact of health aid may have had an impact in the 
immediate years following it, but the affects could have dissipated. Third, problems with 
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the data could cause a failure to find significant impacts. As discussed previously, 
Malawi’s Aid Management Platform was implemented in 2008. While historical data for 
before 2008 is included, the data is considered incomplete. 
Tables 8 and 9 synthesize results from all three empirical analyses, and allow for 
comparing aid allocation and impact. Results suggest that aid going to those most in need 
is not necessarily associated with aid having an impact. For example, 2008 purpose coded 
aid (at the 5-mi aid impact zone) was not allocated effectively according to any variable, 
except that ethnic preference did not appear to influence allocation. (see Table 8). 
However, health aid was associated with reducing 926,249 cases of illness. On the other 
hand, 2010 purpose coded aid (at the 10-mi aid impact zone) reduced nearly 300,000 less 
cases of illness but was allocated effectively on a number of measures. Here, aid went to 
those who had worse health care, were at a greater distance from health facilities, were 
poorer, and who were at a greater risk for disease in terms of temperature.  
 Purpose and activity coded aid also shows not allocating according to greatest 
need doesn’t prevent aid from having an impact (see Table 9). 2009 purpose and activity 
coded aid (at the 5-mi aid impact zone) both reduces among the highest cases of disease 
and is effectively allocated according to five of the eight variables. However, 2010 
purpose and activity coded aid (at the 10-mi aid impact zone) reduces 1.7 million less 
cases of disease than 2009 aid but also is effectively allocated according to five of the 
eight variables.    
 In addition, in Tables 8 and 9 I highlight models that best explained disease 
prevalence from section 5.2 (purpose coded aid at the 10-mi aid impact zone and purpose 
and activity coded aid at the five-mile impact zone). Impacts from these aid variables can 
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be seen as the best estimates for reduction in disease prevalence due to aid. Generally, aid 
variables that best explained disease prevalence also showed to effectively reduce disease 
burdens. From 2008 to 2010, aid variables that best fit that data significantly reduced 
disease at the 95% confidence level for all but one model (2010 purpose coded aid at the 
10-mile radius).  
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Table 7. Impact of Health Aid 
 
Health Aid Variable Foreign Health 
Aid Amounts 
Average 
Treatment 
Effect 
(Percent 
Reduction in 
Disease 
Prevalence 
due to health 
aid)  
Percentage 
of people 
in areas 
that 
received 
foreign 
health aid 
Estimated 
number of 
people in 
areas that 
received aid 
(% received 
aid) * (total 
population) 
Amount 
Spent Per 
Reduction in 
Disease in 2-
week period 
Reduction 
in disease 
burden 
(estimated 
number of 
people) * 
(percentage 
treatment 
effect) 
     2 week period 
Purpose Coded, 2008, 5-mile 
radius 
$21,722,320 2.4% 37.60% 5,646,901 $160.28 135,526 
Purpose Coded, 2009, 10-mile 
radius 
$3,334,305 4% 8.80% 1,323,446 $62.99 52,938 
Purpose Coded, 2010, 10-mile 
radius 
$6,679,754 1% 62.20% 933,148 $71.58 93,315 
Purpose and Activity Coded, 2008, 
5-mile radius 
$21,848,912 4% 47.00% 7,051,653 $77.46 282,067 
Purpose and Activity Coded, 2008, 
10-mile radius 
$21,848,912 4.1% 53.00% 7,955,810 $66.98 326,188 
Purpose and Activity Coded, 
2008,15-mile radius 
$21,848,912 9% 60.00% 8,953,142 $27.12 805,783 
Purpose and Activity Coded, 2009, 
5-mile radius 
$29,709,293 5% 78.60% 11,801,815 $50.35 590,091 
Purpose and Activity Coded, 2009, 
10-mile radius 
$29,709,293 4.1% 84.00% 12,614,280 $57.44 517,185 
Purpose and Activity Coded, 2010, 
5-mile radius 
$32,974,913 2.8% 79.80% 11,979,264 $98.31 335,419 
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Table 7 continued… 
Health Aid Variable Amount Spent Per 
Reduction in Disease 
Incidence 
Disease reduction Amount Spent 
Per Reduction 
in Disease 
Disease reduction 
 1 year period 1 year period, adjusted 
Purpose Coded, 2008, 5-mile radius $6.16 3,523,666 $23.45 926,249 
Purpose Coded, 2009, 10-mile radius $2.42 1,376,384 $9.22 361,803 
Purpose Coded, 2010, 10-mile radius $2.75 2,426,185 $10.47 637,760 
Purpose and Activity Coded, 2008, 5-mile 
radius 
$2.98 7,333,719 $11.33 1,927,779 
Purpose and Activity Coded, 2008, 10-mile 
radius 
$2.58 8,480,893 $9.80 2,229,331 
Purpose and Activity Coded, 2008,15-mile 
radius 
$1.04 20,950,352 $3.97 5,507,117 
Purpose and Activity Coded, 2009, 5-mile 
radius 
$1.94 15,342,360 $7.37 4,032,972 
Purpose and Activity Coded, 2009, 10-mile 
radius 
$2.21 13,446,823 $8.41 3,534,701 
Purpose and Activity Coded, 2010, 5-mile 
radius 
$3.78 8,720,904 $14.38 2,292,422 
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Table 8. Allocation and Effectiveness of Purpose Coded Aid.  
 Health Care 
Quality 
Disease 
Prevalence 
Distance to 
Health 
Facility 
Wealth 
Perception/ 
Poverty 
Level 
Pop. 
Density/ 
Distance to 
Pop. Center 
Presidential 
Ethnic 
Match 
Elevation/ 
Temperature 
Precipitation Reduced 
Disease 
Burden (If 
Effective) 
Before 2008 
Before 
2008 (5m) 
- - - - - + - +  
Before 
2008 (10m) 
- . - - - + - +  
Before 
2008 (15m) 
- + - - - - - +  
2008 
2008 (5m) . - - - - + - - 926,249 
2008 (10m) . - - - - + - +  
2008 (15m) + - - - - + - +  
2009 
2009 (5m) + - - - - + - +  
2009 (10m) + - - - - + - + 361,803 
2009 (15m) . - - - - + - +  
2010 
2010 (5m) + . - + - - + -  
2010 (10m) + . + + - - + - 637,760 
2010 (15m) + . - + - - + -  
A plus indicates aid going to those most in need, a minus indicates aid going to those less in need, and a period indicates aid relatively unresponsive to that variable (having an AIC 
weight less than 0.50). I report the estimated number of cases of illness that were prevented due to foreign aid if reductions in foreign aid foreign aid significantly reduced disease 
burdens at the 95 percent confidence level. Additionally, drawing from results of section 5.2, I highlight aid variables that best explained health disease prevalence (10-mile aid 
impact zone for purpose coded aid). Pluses are given when aid is associated with: worse health care, higher disease prevalence, greater distance from a health facility, more poor or 
less wealthy individuals, greater distance from a population center or less population density, not a presidential ethnic match, lower elevations or higher temperatures, and greater 
precipitation. While 2009 presidential ethnic match for purpose coded aid was omitted from regressions, I denoted it with pluses because it predicted failure perfectly (no 
individuals in predominantly Lomwe areas received aid). 
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Table 9. Allocation and Effectiveness of Purpose and Activity Coded Aid 
 Health Care 
Quality 
Disease 
Prevalence 
Distance to 
Health 
Facility 
Wealth 
Perception/ 
Poverty 
Level 
Pop. 
Density/ 
Distance to 
Pop. Center 
Presidential 
Ethnic 
Match 
Elevation/ 
Temperature 
Precipitation Reduced 
Disease 
Burden (If 
Effective) 
Before 2008 
Before 
2008 (5m) 
- . - - - + + +  
Before 
2008 (10m) 
- . - - - + + +  
Before 
2008 (15m) 
- + - - - - + +  
2008 
2008 (5m) . - - - - + - + 1,927,779 
2008 (10m) + - - - - + - + 2,229,331 
2008 (15m) + - - - - + - + 5,507,117 
2009 
2009 (5m) + - + + - + + - 4,032,972 
2009 (10m) . - . + - + + + 3,534,701 
2009 (15m) - . - + - - + +  
2010 
2010 (5m) + . + - + + + - 2,292,422 
2010 (10m) + . + - + + + -  
2010 (15m) + . + - + + + -  
A plus indicates aid going to those most in need, a minus indicates aid going to those less in need, and a period indicates aid relatively unresponsive to that variable (having an AIC 
weight less than 0.50). I report the estimated number of cases of illness that were prevented due to foreign aid if reductions in foreign aid foreign aid significantly reduced disease 
burdens at the 95 percent confidence level. Additionally, drawing from results of section 5.2, I highlight aid variables that best explained health disease prevalence (5-mile aid 
impact zone for purpose and activity coded aid). Pluses are given when aid is associated with: worse health care, higher disease prevalence, greater distance from a health facility, 
more poor or less wealthy individuals, greater distance from a population center or less population density, not a presidential ethnic match, lower elevations or higher temperatures, 
and greater precipitation.  
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6. DISCUSSION 
 
 The main conclusion from this paper is that health aid is found to be effective 
when analyzing aid at the sub-national level. Logistic models show increases in foreign 
health aid associated with reduced disease burdens for a number of health aid variables, 
and propensity score matching methods confirm that health aid causally reduced disease 
burdens in three of the four time periods considered (2008, 2009, and 2010). Effective 
health aid is seen despite worries about corruption and poor government capacity to 
implement programs. This is not to refute donor concerns about inefficiencies involved in 
foreign aid. However, it highlights that, despite potential inefficiencies, improvements 
were seen.  
Additionally, reduced disease prevalence occurs despite mixed evidence about 
whether aid was allocated to those most in need. Effective aid was seen even as allocation 
based on health conditions varied over years, and when, in most years, the poorest 
individuals were less likely to receive aid compared to others. However, while in some 
cases aid may go to individuals who are relatively better off than others, these individuals 
likely still face poor health conditions, as poverty and poor health conditions are 
pervasive across Malawi. This may result from aid being targeted to areas where it is 
likely to have the greatest per capita affect rather than targeting aid towards the poorest 
individuals. Allocation results suggest this could be the case. In most years, more 
populated areas receive more aid (see Figure 5 and Tables 8 and 9), where poverty rates 
are lower in urban areas compared to rural areas (Mussa and Pauw 2011). Implementing 
aid programs in more densely populated areas may mean that aid is more likely to impact 
a greater number of people for a lower per capita aid amount.  
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Results contrast with cross-national studies that find that aid does not significantly 
reduce disease burdens. This discrepancy could be viewed from multiple perspectives. 
First, Malawi may be an outlier. This paper focused on aid impacts in a single country, 
while cross-national studies examine average aid impacts across multiple countries. On 
average, health aid may not have an impact, but aid impacts in Malawi may be above 
average. Malawi both is among the poorest countries in the world and receives above 
average per capita aid amounts. Therefore, foreign aid may be uniquely positioned to 
substantially improve conditions in Malawi. However, sub-national analysis showing 
foreign health aid to be effective does provide a critique against broad claims from cross-
national studies that foreign health aid is ineffective and should not be pursued. Even if 
health aid might not, on average, have substantial impacts, here results highlight that 
under certain conditions health aid does have notable aggregate impacts.  
Second, contrasting results could suggest that “data deceive” at the macro-level, 
rather than accurately portraying the effects of health aid. Here, results give evidence 
against the aggregate impact of health aid being “less the sum of its parts.” Aggregate 
health aid at the sub-national level is found to effectively reduce disease burdens. This is 
not to say that aid does not have negative effects (such as exacerbating poor governance 
and reducing government investment in health infrastructure). However, results suggest 
that the beneficial impacts of health aid outweigh potential negative impacts, at least in 
terms of directly reducing disease burdens. While sub-national analysis of health aid 
reveals health aid to be effective, aggregating health outcome and aid amount 
characteristics to a single number for a country may wash out health aid impacts. 
Average treatment effects did show aid reducing in the millions of cases of disease; 
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however, the percentages in disease reduction were relatively small and could explain 
why impacts may not be picked up on cross-national studies. However, dollar amounts to 
reduce illness were also small, showing aid to be financially effective and suggesting that 
greater health aid investment could lead to more substantial impacts. While results cannot 
show that health aid does drive development, this perspective suggests that health aid can 
not only “benefit some of the people some of the time,” but increased investment in the 
health sector could promote larger economic growth and “society-wide transformation” 
(Easterly 2003).  
Third, results could be viewed in harmony. Sub-national analysis showing aid to 
be effective highlights that aid does, as Easterly (2003) argues, “benefit some of the 
people some of the time;” however, cross-national studies could still be valid in 
highlighting that aid does not provide a “catalyst for society-wide transformation.” Even 
if aggregate aid can be shown to notably reduce disease burdens at the sub-national level, 
providing evidence against aggregate negative impacts, health aid could still be limited in 
promoting vastly improved health conditions. As mentioned before, percentage 
reductions in disease burdens were relatively small. Other factors may be more important 
in driving sustained improvements in health and socio-economic conditions. In particular, 
government investment in health infrastructure strongly determines health conditions. 
WHO Director General Gro Harlem Brundtland argued that the, “ultimate responsibility 
for the performance of a country’s health system lies with the government.” For example, 
Cuba has low economic resources but strong political resources devoted towards high 
quality health care, leaving Cuba with low disease burdens (Campion and Morrissey 
2013; Drain and Barry 2010; Keck and Reed 2012). Therefore, if health aid does not 
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influence these other barriers, such as quality of governance, it may be limited in its 
ability to provide “society-wide transformation” in vastly approved health conditions.  
This paper provides evidence that health aid, as a whole, can improve health 
conditions at the sub-national level. However, future research is needed to better 
understand the extent of the impact of health aid. As discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs, questions remain about the generalizability of results and the ability for 
health aid to help drive development. Furthermore, while this paper narrows the analysis 
from cross-national to sub-national analysis and broadens the perspective from the 
project-level, further refinement can be made in considering all health aid projects but 
better examining differences between them. For example, instead of being satisfied with 
the conclusion that purpose coded health aid projects completed in 2008 reduced disease 
burdens (for those in districts that received aid and within a 5-mi radius of specifically 
located aid), we can ask what was it about those projects that made them effective. The 
analysis says that, collectively, Norway providing aid in the form of medical education 
and Germany providing aid in the form of basic health care and basic nutrition caused a 
reduction of an estimated 926,249 cases of disease (Tierney et al 2011). However, further 
questions can be asked. Are some projects effective while others not, and what makes the 
effective projects successful? Do projects allow for greater country ownership of 
improving health outcomes, or do they create dependency on foreign donors? How does 
sub-national allocation and impact of health aid differ between donor groups— for 
example, between bilateral and multilateral organizations, and between western and non-
western donors? While further refinements can be made, this paper emphasizes the 
benefits of more closely examining aid impacts, and it cautions against taking 
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insignificant aid impacts found in macro-level studies to mean that health aid should not 
be pursued.  
 
7. CONCLUSION  
 
 The impact of foreign health aid has been an increasingly contested topic as aid 
flows towards the health sector have increased in the past decades. Scholars examining 
health aid impacts at the macro-level have largely failed to find significant impacts, while 
a number of scholars have found notable impacts at the project level. Furthermore, other 
scholars emphasize the potential of health aid to not only improve health conditions but 
to help drive development. Contrasting results have fueled debates, but have also led to 
the emergence of theories that try to explain this apparent ‘micro-macro aid paradox,’ 
where project-level impacts are seen while macro-level impacts are not. Here, scholars 
have hypothesized that while specific health projects may have benefits, the aggregate 
impacts of aid project have negative consequences, ultimately making aggregate impacts 
not seen.  
 I utilize new geocoded aid data from Malawi to examine aggregate health aid 
impacts at the sub-national level. The approach provides a new perspective to examine 
aid, narrowing cross-national analysis while broadening project-level analysis. In 
particular, I examine the impact of health aid and how aid is allocated, analyzing how aid 
responds to socio-economic, health, and political variables. In addition, I ask how 
allocation might influence the impact of health aid. Similar to broader debates about 
health aid, the impact of health aid within Malawi is not clear. Some donors highlight that 
health aid has been beneficial but impacts have been limited due to inefficiencies in the 
use of aid funds. Corruption and poor governance heighten the chance of minimal aid 
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effectiveness. However, other donors and organizations praise significant impacts of 
health aid. Therefore, better understanding the aggregate impact of health aid in Malawi 
is particularly warranted.  
 I find that aggregate health aid has a statistically significant impact on decreasing 
health burdens, reducing an estimated 0.3 to 5 million cases of illness per year 
(depending on year and definition of health aid). Effective aid is seen despite mixed 
results over aid going to those with the poorest health conditions and aid generally not 
going to the poorest individuals. Allocations results suggest, though, that aid is allocated 
to areas with greater populations where it may have a larger per capita impact.  
 Despite positive impacts seen, results do not help to resolve disputes between 
those who argue aid is only equipped to “benefit some of the people some of the time,” 
(Easterly 2003) versus others who argue health aid can catalyze development. However, 
while results cannot show that there were no inefficiencies or negative consequences of 
aggregate aid, results do show overall positive impacts despite potential inefficiencies or 
negative consequences. This gives evidence against scholars who argue that negative 
impacts of aid may wash out its aggregate impact, at least in terms of health sector aid in 
Malawi. While questions remain about the role of health aid, results do refute broad 
claims from macro-level studies that argue that health aid is not beneficial and should not 
be used. This is nothing new to scholars who examine project level impacts; however, it 
provides new evidence of health aid effectiveness. 
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Appendix 
 
              Table 8. Burden of Illnesses	  for	  Fifteen	  Most	  Prevalent	  Illnesses19 
Illness Number of 
Cases 
Average Days Lost 
Due to Illness 
How much spent 
on Illness 
Fever, Malaria 4383 3.01 
(3.30) 
78.44 
(407.31) 
Flu 736 1.71 
(2.58) 
48.91 
(439.85) 
Stomach Ache 602 2.61 
(3.03) 
83.56 
(589.67) 
Headache 567 2.21 
(2.97) 
47.66 
(280.99) 
Lower respiratory 
(chest, lungs) 
504 1.85 
(3.11) 
56.56 
(245.15) 
Diarrhea 395 2.29 
(2.91) 
43.44 
(182.82) 
Sore Throat 366 2.74 
(3.82) 
31.61 
(122.80) 
Upper respiratory 
(sinuses) 
247 2.87 
(3.76) 
71.82 
(324.66) 
Wound 240 3.76 
(4.15) 
79.29 
(413.86) 
Skin Problems 207 4.05 
(4.51) 
119.13 
(426.68) 
Dental Problem 166 3.56 
(3.64) 
44.91 
(169.95) 
Backache 147 3.89 
(4.18) 
99.73 
(471.03) 
Asthma 145 3.42 
(3.61) 
60.344 
(260.80) 
Eye Problem 114 3.52 
(4.22) 
52.37 
(218.16) 
Ear/nose/throat 
problem 
78 2.14 
(3.00) 
10.26 
(65.64) 
                            Data from the LSMS-ISA. Standard deviations reported in parentheses.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Money amounts are in Malawi Kwacha. The exchange rate at the end of 2010, when the data was 
recorded was 1 USD = 152 MK. See: Exchange Rates UK, "US Dollar to Malawi Kwacha (USD MWK) 
for 31 December 2010 (31/12/2010)." Last modified 2014. http://www.exchangerates.org.uk/USD-MWK-
31_12_2010-exchange-rate-history.html. 
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Table 9. Purpose coded aid by donor.  
Donor Before 2008 2008 2009 2010 
US Agency for International 
Development 
   $3,047,975 
Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation 
(NORAD) 
  
$9,764,118 
 
$1,829,181 
 
$3,631,779 
Icelandic International 
Development Agency 
(ICEIDA) 
  $1,505,123  
German Agency for 
International Cooperation 
(GIZ) 
 $11,958,202   
KFW Bankengruppe $4,018,889    
European Union (EU) $24,785,008    
Total $28,803,897 $21,722,320 $3,334,304 $6,679,754 
Data from Aiddata 
Table 10. Purpose coded aid by type 
Type Before 2008 2008 2009 2010 
Health, combination of 
general, basic, and population 
policy/reproductive health 
purposes 
   
$1,829,181 
 
$3,631,779 
Infectious & Parasitic disease 
control 
   $3,047,975 
Basic health infrastructure $4,018,889  $1,505,123  
Basic health care  $6,314,358   
Basic nutrition  $5,643,843   
Medical education/training  $9,764,118   
Medical services $7,338,431    
Health policy and 
administrative management 
$17,446,576    
Total $28,803,897 $21,722,320 $3,334,304 $6,679,754 
Data from Aiddata 
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Table 11. Activity coded aid by donor 
Donor Before 2008 2008 2009 2010 
African Development Bank 
(AfDB) 
   $18,412,772 
Icelandic International 
Development Agency 
(ICEIDA) 
   $3,585,746 
Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) 
 $126,5920 $412,663 $4,296,640 
US Agency for International 
Development 
  $13,891,083  
Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation 
(NORAD) 
  $3,333,246  
UK Department for 
International Development 
(DfID) 
  $6,291,428  
Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) 
  $2,446,567  
World Bank 
 
$33,826,485    
Total $33,826,485 $126,592 $26,374,988 $26,295,158 
Data from Aiddata 
 
Table 12. Activity coded aid by type 
Type Before 2008 2008 2009 2010 
Agricultural development   $412,663 $18,412,772 
Basic drinking water supply and 
basic sanitation 
   $3,585,746 
Food aid/Food security 
programmes 
  $13,891,083 $4,296,640 
Multisector aid   $3,333,246  
Population policies/ programmes 
and reproductive health, 
combinations of activities 
  $6,291,428  
Social/ welfare services  $126592   
Education policy and 
administrative management 
$33,826,485    
Total $33,826,485 $126,592 $23,928,420 $26,295,158 
Data from Aiddata 
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Table 13. Summary Statistics of Variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Disease 
Prevalence 
.173094 .3783319 0 1 
Distance to 
Health Facility 
4.053472  2.834453 0 22.5465 
Health Care 
Quality 
1.755043 .5784383 0 3 
Population 
Density (in 
hundreds of 
people). 
6.217847 16.78427 0 220.9393 
Distance to 
Population 
Center 
34.8844  22.81616 .11 120.67 
Lomwe .1163151 .3206052 0 1 
Wealth 
Perception 
2.064641 .9153578 0 6 
Poverty Level 2.62512 1.220955 0 5 
Temp 217.313 20.14939 173 264 
Precipitation 109.0693 24.97654 75.5 214.2 
Elevation 87.13193 35.02636 3.8 174.2 
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Table 14. Spearman Correlations 
 Disease 
Prevalence 
Health 
Care 
Quality 
Distance 
to Health 
Facility 
Distance 
to Pop. 
Center 
Pop. 
Den 
Poverty 
Level 
Wealth 
Perception 
Presidential 
Ethnic 
Match 
Precipitation Elevation Temperature 
Disease 
Prevalence 
1           
Health Care 
Quality 
-0.046 1          
Distance to 
Health 
Facility 
0.015 -0.0695 1         
Distance to 
Pop. Center 
-0.0011 -0.0073 0.26 1        
Pop. Density -0.0076 0.055 -0.54 -0.45 1       
Poverty 
Level 
-0.059 0.11 -0.13 -0.12 0.13 1      
Wealth 
Perception 
-0.021 0.15 -0.10 -0.079 0.10 0.35 1     
Presidential 
Ethnic 
Match 
0.0075 0.056 -0.077 0.091 0.18 -0.10 0.036 1    
Precipitation 0.0033 0.096 -0.10 -0.023 0.13 -0.0059 0.055 0.41 1   
Elevation -0.0096 0.065 -0.045 0.029 0.031 0.039 -0.010 -0.092 -0.14 1  
Temperature 0.0048 -0.056 0.12 0.14 -0.18 -0.053 -0.014 0.0073 0.12 -0.94 1 
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Table 14 continued… 
 Before 
2008 Aid 
(5mi) 
2008 
Aid 
(5mi) 
2009 
Aid 
(5mi) 
2010 
Aid 
(5mi) 
Before 
2008 Aid 
(10mi) 
2008 
Aid 
(10mi) 
2009 
Aid 
(10mi) 
2010 
Aid 
(10mi) 
Before 
2008 Aid 
(15mi) 
2008 
Aid 
(15mi) 
2009 
Aid 
(15mi) 
2010 
Aid 
(15mi) 
B2008 Aid (5mi) 1            
2008 Aid (5mi) 0.44 1           
2009 Aid (5mi) 0.31 0.10 1          
2010 Aid (5mi) -0.063 0.093 0.22 1         
B2008 Aid (10mi) 0.80 0.41 0.23 -0.10 1        
2008 Aid (10mi) 0.38 0.87 0.075 0.043 0.44 1       
2009 Aid (10mi) 0.25 0.18 0.87 0.25 0.32 0.14 1      
2010 Aid (10mi) -0.080 0.062 0.21 0.95 -0.12 0.0071 0.24 1     
B2008 Aid (15mi) 0.68 0.44 0.20 -0.091 0.85 0.45 0.28 -0.11 1    
2008 Aid (15mi) 0.36 0.75 0.065 0.0042 0.41 0.85 0.12 -0.033 0.45 1   
2009 Aid (15mi) 0.20 0.23 0.77 0.28 0.27 0.19 0.88 0.27 0.33 0.16 1  
2010 Aid (15mi) -0.10 0.022 0.20 0.90 -0.15 -0.039 0.22 0.94 -0.14 -0.068 0.25 1 
Disease 
Prevalence 
-0.034 -0.040 -0.031 0.0093 -0.020 -0.025 -0.034 0.0099 -0.0047 -0.0098 -0.028 0.014 
Health Care 
Quality 
0.083 0.046 -0.0055 -0.10 0.093 0.038 0.0025 -0.0903 0.087 0.020 0.012 -0.086 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
-0.38 -0.26 -0.12 -0.0080 -0.40 -0.27 -0.13 -0.0022 -0.35 -0.23 -0.11 -0.014 
Distance to Pop. 
Center 
-0.51 -0.54 -0.16 -0.21 -0.57 -0.57 -0.21 -0.1819 -0.59 -0.59 -0.23 -0.14 
Pop. Density 0.51 0.39 0.20 0.075 0.53 0.39 0.23 0.089 0.50 0.34 0.19 0.090 
Poverty Level 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.0015 0.15 0.17 0.13 -0.018 0.13 0.13 0.13 -0.028 
Wealth Perception 0.13 0.12 0.084 0.022 0.10 0.092 0.078 0.026 0.090 0.061 0.080 0.027 
Presidential 
Ethnic Match 
-0.056 -0.037 -0.098 -0.062 0.0099 -0.0559 -0.1126 -0.013 0.10 -0.058 -0.12 0.032 
Precipitation 0.086 0.13 -0.14 -0.26 0.097 0.14 -0.19 -0.22 0.10 0.14 -0.22 -0.22 
Elevation 0.21 0.044 -0.0056 -0.0061 0.22 0.051 0.027 -0.038 0.18 0.041 0.038 -0.076 
Temperature -0.32 -0.14 -0.052 -0.044 -0.35 -0.15 -0.098 -0.026 -0.33 -0.13 -0.11 0.0064 
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Table 15. Variables.  
Variable  Description Dataset 
Disease Incidence “During the past 2 weeks, 
have you suffered from an 
illness or injury?” 
LSMS-ISA 
Quality of Health Care “Concerning the standard of 
health care you receive for 
household members, which of 
the following is true? (1 – It 
was less than adequate for 
household needs; 2 – It was 
just adequate for household 
needs; 3 – It was more than 
adequate for household 
needs).” 
LSMS-ISA 
Distance to Health Center Euclidian distance from a 
health facility.  
Malawi Spatial Data Portal 
Distance to Population Center Euclidian distance to a 
population center of over 
20,000 people.  
LSMS-ISA 
Population Density  Population estimates in 1km 
grids in 2000.  
Socioeconomic Data and 
Applications Center 
(SEDAC) 
Wealth Perception “Imagine six steps, the first 
being the poorest people and 
the sixth the richest. On which 
step are you today? (1-6).”  
LSMS-ISA 
Poverty Level “Which of the following is 
true? Your current income . . .  
Allows you to build your 
savings (1) 
Allows you to save just a little 
(2) 
Only just meets your expenses 
(3) 
Is not sufficient, so you need 
to use your savings to meet 
expenses (4) 
Is really not sufficient, so you 
need to borrow to meet 
expenses (5)” 
LSMS-ISA 
Presidential Ethnic Match Delineates whether an 
individual was an Enumerated 
Area that was primarily 
Lomwe.  
Malawi 2008 Census 
Temperature Annual mean temperature 
 
LSMS-ISA 
Elevation Elevation LSMS-ISA 
Precipitation Annual precipitation (mm) LSMS-ISA 
Descriptions in quotations are direct quotes from the LSMS-ISA survey.  
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Figure 10. Spatial distribution of foreign health aid. Health aid defined as aid projects 
with a health purpose code. Point-location aid is at the 10-mile radius. 
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Figure 11. Spatial distribution of foreign health aid. Health aid defined as aid projects 
with health purpose and activity codes. Point-location aid is at the 10-mile radius. 
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Figure 12. Location of interviews for LSMS-ISA dataset. 
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Figure 13. Location of households that are in a predominantly Lomwe area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   98	  
Table 16. Purpose Coded Aid Allocation at the 5-mile Aid Impact Zone 
Estimator values reported with standard errors in parentheses and AIC weights in brackets 
 Foreign Health 
Aid 
Before 2008 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2008 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2009 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2010 
Disease Prevalence -0.15 
(0.060) 
[0.92] 
-0.29 
(0.031) 
[1] 
-0.29 
(0.057) 
[1] 
-0.0014 
(0.0072) 
[0.27] 
Health Care Quality 0.065 
(0.033) 
[0.74] 
0.0016 
(0.0056) 
[0.28] 
-0.25 
(0.037) 
[1] 
-0.38 
(0.018) 
[1] 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
-0.34 
(0.017) 
[1] 
-0.10 
(0.0046) 
[1] 
-0.11 
(0.0092) 
[1] 
-0.0055 
(0.0027) 
[0.75] 
Population Density   0.025 
(0.00081) 
[1] 
 
Distance to Population 
Center 
-0.18 
(0.0035) 
[1] 
-0.066 
(0.00069) 
[1] 
 -0.027 
(0.00049) 
[1] 
Wealth Perception 
 
0.22 
(0.027) 
[1] 
0.34 
(0.013) 
[1] 
0.39 
(0.020) 
[1] 
 
Poverty Level 
 
   0.036 
(0.0084) 
[1] 
Presidential Ethnic 
Match 
-1.48 
(0.085) 
[1] 
-0.71 
(0.040) 
[1] 
 0.38 
(0.035) 
[1] 
Precipitation 0.35 
(0.024) 
[1] 
-0.0037 
(0.0040) 
[1] 
0.081 
(0.024) 
[1] 
-0.12 
(0.0035) 
[1] 
Precipitation2 -0.0014 
(0.00011) 
[1] 
0.00011 
(0.000015) 
[1] 
-0.00075 
(0.00012) 
[1] 
0.00037 
(0.000014) 
[1] 
Elevation 0.42 
(0.010) 
[1] 
0.052 
(0.0019) 
[1] 
0.37 
(0.0099) 
[1] 
 
Elevation2 -0.0019 
(0.000051) 
[1] 
-0.00024 
(0.0000010) 
[1] 
-0.0023 
(0.000059) 
[1] 
 
Temperature    0.53 
(0.010) 
[1] 
Temperature2    -0.0012 
(0.000024) 
[1] 
Intercept -40.41 
(1.45) 
[1] 
-2.06 
(0.26) 
[1] 
-16.51 
(1.29) 
[1] 
-47.27 
(1.10) 
[1] 
ROC Area 0.98 0.86 0.88 0.74 
Actual vs Predicted R^2 0.78 0.33 0.18 0.14 
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Table 17. Purpose Coded Aid Allocation at the 10-mile Aid Impact Zone 
Estimator values reported with standard errors in parentheses and AIC weights in brackets 
 
 
 
 Foreign Health 
Aid 
Before 2008 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2008 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2009 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2010 
Disease Prevalence -0.0071 
(0.017) 
[0.29] 
-0.21 
(0.031) 
[1] 
-0.34 
(0.052) 
[1] 
-0.0010 
(0.0071) 
[0.27] 
Health Care Quality 0.32 
(0.040) 
[1] 
-0.000052 
(0.0055) 
[0.27] 
-0.13 
(0.033) 
[1] 
-0.31 
(0.018) 
[1] 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
-0.34 
(0.013) 
[1] 
-0.12 
(0.0045) 
[1] 
-0.13 
(0.0085) 
[1] 
-0.0029 
(0.0019) 
[0.53] 
Distance to Population 
Center 
-0.17 
(0.0026) 
[1] 
-0.072 
(0.00071) 
[1] 
-0.035 
(0.0011) 
[1] 
-0.025 
(0.00049) 
[1] 
Wealth Perception 
 
 
 
0.30 
(0.013) 
[1] 
0.38 
(0.019) 
[1] 
 
Poverty Level 
 
-0.13 
(0.019) 
[1] 
  0.041 
(0.0084) 
[1] 
Presidential Ethnic 
Match 
-0.73 
(0.079) 
[1] 
-1.07 
(0.041) 
[1] 
 0.57 
(0.035) 
[1] 
Precipitation 0.35 
(0.016) 
[1] 
0.042 
(0.0040) 
[1] 
0.19 
(0.025) 
[1] 
-0.14 
(0.0034) 
[1] 
Precipitation2 -0.0013 
(0.000070) 
[1] 
-0.000068 
(0.000015) 
[1] 
-0.0013 
(0.00012) 
[1] 
0.00048 
(0.000013) 
[1] 
Elevation 0.50 
(0.0090) 
[1] 
0.057 
(0.0018) 
[1] 
0.30 
(0.0078) 
[1] 
 
Elevation2 -0.0024 
(0.000047) 
[1] 
-0.00026 
(0.000010) 
[1] 
-0.0018 
(0.000046) 
[1] 
 
Temperature    0.55 
(0.010) 
[1] 
Temperature2    -0.0012 
(0.000024) 
[1] 
Intercept -43.084 
(1.03) 
[1] 
-4.27 
(0.26) 
[1] 
-18.87 
(1.32) 
[1] 
-47.69 
(1.10) 
[1] 
ROC Area 0.98 0.87 0.88 0.73 
Actual vs Predicted R^2 0.77 0.36 0.27 0.13 
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Table 18. Purpose Coded Aid Allocation at the 15-mile Aid Impact Zone 
Estimator values reported with standard errors in parentheses and AIC weights in brackets 
 
 
 
 Foreign Health 
Aid 
Before 2008 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2008 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2009 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2010 
Disease Prevalence 0.13 
(0.047) 
[1] 
-0.11 
(0.030) 
[1] 
-0.24 
(0.046) 
[1] 
0.0094 
(0.0098) 
[0.37] 
Health Care Quality 0.30 
(0.031) 
[1] 
-0.024 
(0.013) 
[0.65] 
-0.0073 
(0.0098) 
[0.33] 
-0.30 
(0.018) 
[1] 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
-0.18 
(0.0082) 
[1] 
-0.088 
(0.0042) 
[1] 
-0.087 
(0.0074) 
[1] 
-0.018 
(0.0036) 
[1] 
Distance to Population 
Center 
-0.14 
(0.0017) 
[1] 
-0.074 
(0.00071) 
[1] 
-0.039 
(0.00098) 
[1] 
-0.023 
(0.00049) 
[1] 
Wealth Perception 
 
 0.20 
(0.013) 
[1] 
0.33 
(0.018) 
[1] 
 
Poverty Level 
 
-0.11 
(0.015) 
[1] 
  0.043 
(0.0085) 
[1] 
Presidential Ethnic 
Match 
1.35 
(0.065) 
[1] 
-1.22 
(0.042) 
[1] 
 0.93 
(0.036) 
[1] 
Precipitation 0.15 
(0.0096) 
[1] 
0.086 
(0.0040) 
[1] 
0.23 
(0.023) 
[1] 
-0.16 
(0.0035) 
[1] 
Precipitation2 -0.00056 
(00041) 
[1] 
-0.00024 
(0.000015) 
[1] 
-0.0046 
(0.00011) 
[1] 
0.00053 
(0.000013) 
[1] 
Elevation 0.33 
(0.0056) 
[1] 
0.048 
(0.0016) 
[1] 
0.25 
(0.0064) 
[1] 
 
Elevation2 -0.0017 
(0.000030) 
[1] 
-0.00022 
(0.0000093) 
[1] 
-0.0015 
(0.000037) 
[1] 
 
Temperature    0.53 
(0.010) 
[1] 
Temperature2    -0.0012 
(0.000024) 
[1] 
Intercept -22.91 
(0.63) 
[1] 
-5.81 
(0.26) 
[1] 
-19.08 
(1.22) 
[1] 
-45.12 
(1.10) 
[1] 
ROC Area 0.96 0.87 0.87 0.72 
Actual vs Predicted R^2 0.70 0.37 0.27 0.13 
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Table 19. Purpose and Activity Coded Aid Allocation at the 5-mile Aid Impact Zone 
Estimator values reported with standard errors in parentheses and AIC weights in brackets 
 Foreign Health 
Aid 
Before 2008 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2008 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2009 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2010 
Disease Prevalence -0.0070 
(0.018) 
[0.28] 
-0.29 
(0.027) 
[1] 
-0.19 
(0.034) 
[1] 
0.00078 
(0.0089) 
[0.27] 
Health Care Quality 0.18 
(0.043) 
[1] 
-0.0098 
(0.0079) 
[0.44] 
-0.078 
(0.023) 
[1] 
-0.77 
(0.022) 
[1] 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
-0.35 
(0.0152) 
[1] 
-0.13 
(0.0040) 
[1] 
0.020 
(0.0051) 
[1] 
0.074 
(0.0052) 
[1] 
Population Density   0.18 
(0.0069) 
[1] 
-0.021 
(0.00074) 
[1] 
Distance to Population 
Center 
-0.18 
(0.0032) 
[1] 
-0.034 
(0.00051) 
[1] 
  
Wealth Perception 
 
0.16 
(0.026) 
[1] 
0.34 
(0.012) 
[1] 
 0.22 
(0.014) 
[1] 
Poverty Level 
 
  0.18 
(0.011) 
[1] 
 
Presidential Ethnic 
Match 
-1.36 
(0.088) 
[1] 
-1.49 
(0.037) 
[1] 
-0.29 
(0.044) 
[1] 
-1.13 
(0.039) 
[1] 
Precipitation 0.42 
(0.022) 
[1] 
0.064 
(0.0035) 
[1] 
-0.045 
0.0045) 
[1] 
-0.23 
(0.0051) 
[1] 
Precipitation2 -0.0017 
(0.0001) 
[1] 
-0.00019 
(0.000014) 
[1] 
0.00014 
(0.000017) 
[1] 
8.90 
(0.000021) 
[1] 
Elevation  0.080 
(0.0018) 
[1] 
 -0.043 
(0.0024) 
[1] 
Elevation2  -0.00041 
(0.000010) 
[1] 
 0.00027 
(0.000014) 
[1] 
Temperature 0.86 
(0.042) 
[1] 
 0.35 
(0.017) 
[1] 
 
Temperature2 -0.0023 
(0.00010) 
[1] 
 -0.00095 
(0.000039) 
[1] 
 
Intercept -103.87 
(4.71) 
[1] 
-6.85 
(0.23) 
[1] 
-26.95 
(1.88) 
[1] 
17.70 
(0.32) 
[1] 
ROC Area 0.98 0.79 0.86 0.79 
Actual vs Predicted R^2 0.78 0.21 0.26 0.15 
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Table 20. Purpose and Activity Coded Aid Allocation at the 10-mile Aid Impact Zone 
Estimator values reported with standard errors in parentheses and AIC weights in brackets 
 Foreign Health 
Aid 
Before 2008 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2008 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2009 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2010 
Disease Prevalence -0.0019 
(0.015) 
[0.27] 
-0.23 
(0.028) 
[1] 
-0.14 
(0.038) 
[1] 
-0.0037 
(0.0099) 
[0.28] 
Health Care Quality 0.26 
(0.039) 
[1] 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
[0.62] 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
[0.49] 
-0.77 
(0.024) 
[1] 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
-0.32 
(0.012) 
[1] 
-0.15 
(0.0040) 
[1] 
0.0034 
(0.0026) 
[0.46] 
0.085 
(0.0056) 
[1] 
Population Density   0.16 
(0.0075) 
[1] 
-0.021 
(0.00078) 
[1] 
Distance to Population 
Center 
-0.18 
(0.0025) 
[1] 
-0.042 
(0.00055) 
[1] 
  
Wealth Perception 
 
 
 
0.32 
(0.012) 
[1] 
 0.21 
(0.015) 
[1] 
Poverty Level 
 
-0.12 
(0.018) 
[1] 
 0.14 
(0.013) 
[1] 
 
Presidential Ethnic 
Match 
-0.81 
(0.078) 
[1] 
-1.80 
(0.040) 
[1] 
-0.53 
(0.051) 
[1] 
-1.40 
(0.043) 
[1] 
Precipitation 0.46 
(0.016) 
[1] 
0.10 
(0.0037) 
[1] 
0.033 
(0.0049) 
[1] 
-0.42 
(0.0075) 
[1] 
Precipitation2 -0.0018 
(0.000069) 
[1] 
-0.00034 
(0.000014) 
[1] 
-0.00015 
(0.000018) 
[1] 
0.0017 
(0.000032) 
[1] 
Elevation  0.084 
(0.0018) 
[1] 
 -0.051 
(0.0027) 
[1] 
Elevation2  -0.00043 
(0.000010) 
[1] 
 0.00030 
(0.000015) 
[1] 
Temperature 1.47 
(0.040) 
1] 
 0.28 
(0.021) 
[1] 
 
Temperature2 -0.0037 
(0.000096) 
1] 
 -0.00079 
(0.000047) 
[1] 
 
Intercept -169.06 
(4.45) 
[1] 
-8.72 
(0.25) 
[1] 
-22.74 
(2.34) 
[1] 
28.63 
(0.45) 
[1] 
ROC Area 0.98 0.82 0.87 0.82 
Actual vs Predicted R^2 0.77 0.25 0.29 0.21 
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Table 21. Purpose and Activity Coded Aid Allocation at the 15-mile Aid Impact Zone 
Estimator values reported with standard errors in parentheses and AIC weights in brackets 
 Foreign Health 
Aid 
Before 2008 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2008 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2009 
Foreign Health 
Aid 
2010 
Disease Prevalence 0.11 
(0.041) 
[0.94] 
-0.16 
(0.028) 
[1] 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
[0.32] 
-0.0053 
(0.011) 
[0.29] 
Health Care Quality 0.19 
(0.029) 
[1] 
-0.069 
(0.019) 
[1] 
0.076 
(0.031) 
[0.90] 
-0.77 
(0.026) 
[1] 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
-0.16 
(0.0075) 
[1] 
-0.12 
(0.0039) 
[1] 
-0.11 
(0.0067) 
[1] 
0.083 
(0.0059) 
[1] 
Population Density    
 
-0.023 
(0.00086) 
[1] 
Distance to Population 
Center 
-0.14 
(0.0016) 
[1] 
-0.046 
(0.00057) 
[1] 
-0.026 
(0.00094) 
[1] 
 
Wealth Perception 
 
 0.24 
(0.013) 
[1] 
 0.23 
(0.016) 
[1] 
Poverty Level 
 
-0.097 
(0.014) 
[1] 
 0.11 
(0.017) 
[1] 
 
Presidential Ethnic 
Match 
0.83 
(0.061) 
[1] 
-1.80 
(0.040) 
[1] 
0.39 
(0.086) 
[1] 
-1.59 
(0.050) 
[1] 
Precipitation 0.16 
(0.0085) 
[1] 
0.13 
(0.0038) 
[1] 
0.055 
(0.0060) 
[1] 
-0.83 
(0.014) 
[1] 
Precipitation2 -0.00056 
(0.000035) 
[1] 
-0.00045 
(0.000015) 
[1] 
-0.00024 
(0.000022) 
[1] 
0.0036 
(0.000064) 
[1] 
Elevation  0.072 
(0.0016) 
[1] 
 -0.077 
(0.0032) 
[1] 
Elevation2  -0.00036 
(0.0000091) 
[1] 
 0.00042 
(0.000017) 
[1] 
Temperature 0.79 
(0.026) 
[1] 
 0.59 
(0.026) 
[1] 
 
Temperature2 -0.0020 
(0.000060) 
[1] 
 -0.0015 
(0.000058) 
[1] 
 
Intercept -84.44 
(2.82) 
[1] 
-9.31 
(0.25) 
[1] 
-55.42 
(2.91) 
[1] 
52.06 
(0.80) 
[1] 
ROC Area 0.96 0.83 0.90 0.87 
Actual vs Predicted R^2 0.64 0.25 0.42 0.33 
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Figure 14. Uncertainty in estimators for purpose coded aid at the 5-mile radius, compared 
to model AIC values. Estimators reported for top 2305 models.   
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Figure 15. Uncertainty in estimators for purpose and activity coded aid at the 5-mile 
radius, compared to model AIC values. Estimators reported for top 2305 models.   
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Table 22. Full Tables of Propensity Matching Method.  
 
Purpose Codes Aid, 5-mile radius. 
Average treatment affects reported above, with logistic models used to develop 
propensity scores below. Estimator values are reported with standard errors in 
parentheses.  
*     Significant at 10%  
**   Significant at 5%  
*** Significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 Disease Incidence, 
with before 2008 
health aid 
 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2008 health aid 
 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2009 health aid 
 
Disease Incidence, 
with 2010 health 
aid 
 
Health Aid 0.041 
(0.033) 
-0.024*** 
(0.0083) 
-0.014 
(0.036) 
-0.0031 
(0.0065) 
 
Logistic Models Used to Develop Propensity Scores 
 Health Aid 
Before 2008 
Health Aid 
2008 
Health Aid 
2009 
Health Aid 
2010 
Health Care Quality 0.26*** 
(0.025) 
-0.0032 
(0.020) 
 -0.36*** 
(0.017) 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
 -0.090*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.14*** 
(0.0091) 
 
Distance to Pop 
Center 
 
 
-0.066*** 
(0.00068) 
-0.033*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.022*** 
(0.00046) 
Wealth Perception 0.61*** 
(0.015) 
0.37*** 
(0.013) 
0.41*** 
(0.019) 
-0.021* 
(0.011) 
Presidential Ethnic 
Match 
-0.42*** 
(0.054) 
  0.50*** 
(0.034) 
Precipitation  0.020*** 
(0.00048) 
-0.052*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0034) 
Precipitation2  
 
  0.00031*** 
(0.000013) 
Elevation  0.044*** 
(0.0018) 
 
 
0.036*** 
(0.0012) 
Elevation2  -0.00019*** 
(0.000010) 
 -0.00022*** 
(0.0000073) 
Temperature 0.48*** 
(0.026) 
 1.07*** 
(0.037) 
 
Temperature2 -0.0013*** 
(0.000062) 
 -0.0024*** 
(0.000083) 
 
 
Intercept -46.19*** 
(2.60) 
-3.23*** 
(0.10) 
-113.83*** 
(3.96) 
8.15*** 
(0.21) 
ROC Area 0.82 0.85 0.82 0.72 
Actual vs Predicted 
R^2 
0.19 0.32 0.19 0.11 
Maximum Propensity 
Score Matching 
Distance 
0.057 0.059 0.022 0.040 
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Purpose Codes Aid, 10-mile radius. 
Average treatment affects reported above, with logistic models used to develop 
propensity scores below. Estimator values are reported with standard errors in 
parentheses.  
    * Significant at 10%  
  ** Significant at 5%  
*** Significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 Disease Incidence, 
with before 2008 
health aid 
 
Disease Incidence, 
with 2008 health 
aid 
 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2009 health aid 
 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2010 health aid 
 
Health Aid 0.016 
(0.035) 
-0.010 
(0.0071) 
-0.040*** 
(0.012) 
-0.010** 
(0.0053) 
 
Logistic Models Used to Develop Propensity Scores 
 Before 2008 Health 
Aid 
2008 Health Aid 2009 Health Aid 2010 Health Aid 
Health Care Qualiy 0.29*** 
(0.021) 
-0.013 
(0.020) 
-0.076** 
(0.030) 
-0.31*** 
(0.017) 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
 -0.10*** 
(0.0044) 
-0.14*** 
(0.0082) 
-0.0076** 
(0.0036) 
Distance to Pop 
Center 
 
 
-0.073*** 
(0.00071) 
-0.039*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.021*** 
(0.00045) 
Wealth Perception 0.42*** 
(0.013) 
0.33*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.065*** 
(0.010) 
Poverty Level  
 
 0.22*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
Presidential Ethnic 
Match 
0.19*** 
(0.038) 
  0.48*** 
(0.036) 
Precipitation  0.010*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.058*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.023*** 
(0.00047) 
Precipitation2  
 
0.000033** 
(0.000015) 
  
Elevation  0.048*** 
(0.0017) 
 
 
 
Elevation2  -0.00021*** 
(0.0000097) 
  
Temperature 0.62*** 
(0.022) 
 -0.0047*** 
(0.00081) 
0.50*** 
(0.010) 
Temperature2 -0.0016*** 
(0.000052) 
  -0.0011*** 
(0.000023) 
Intercept -61.23*** 
(2.24) 
-1.97*** 
(0.24) 
5.58*** 
(0.23) 
-50.11*** 
(1.08) 
ROC Area 0.79 0.87 0.77 0.71 
Actual vs Predicted 
R^2 
0.18 0.35 0.28 0.10 
Maximum Propensity 
Score Matching 
Distance 
0.068 0.063 0.028 0.037 
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Purpose Codes Aid, 15-mile radius. 
Average treatment affects reported above, with logistic models used to develop 
propensity scores below. Estimator values are reported with standard errors in 
parentheses.  
    * Significant at 10%  
  ** Significant at 5%  
*** Significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 Disease Incidence, 
with before 2008 
health aid 
 
Disease Incidence, 
with 2008 health 
aid 
 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2009 health aid 
 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2010 health aid 
 
Health Aid 0.020* 
(0.011) 
-0.018* 
(0.010) 
-0.026 
(0.052) 
-0.0083 
(0.0058) 
 
Logistic Models Used to Develop Propensity Scores 
 Before 2008 
Health Aid 
2008 Health Aid 2009 Health Aid 2010 Health Aid 
Health Care Quality 0.37*** 
(0.027) 
-0.058*** 
(0.019) 
 -0.30*** 
(0.018) 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
-0.27*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.070*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.097*** 
(0.0071) 
-0.020*** 
(0.0036) 
Distance to Pop 
Center 
-0.11*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.074*** 
(0.00070) 
-0.042*** 
(0.00093) 
-0.019*** 
(0.00046) 
Wealth Perception -0.0058 
(0.017) 
0.25*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.070*** 
(0.011) 
Poverty Level  
 
 0.21*** 
(0.013) 
 
 
Presidential Ethnic 
Match 
   0.84*** 
(0.038) 
Precipitation  0.051*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.059*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.023*** 
(0.00047) 
Precipitation2  
 
-0.00013*** 
(0.000015) 
  
Elevation  0.039*** 
(0.0015) 
 
 
 
Elevation2  -0.00017*** 
(0.0000090) 
  
Temperature -0.049*** 
(0.00083) 
 -0.0067*** 
(0.00074) 
0.47*** 
(0.010) 
Temperature2    -0.0011*** 
(0.000023) 
Intercept 12.24*** 
(0.19) 
-3.31*** 
(0.24) 
6.29*** 
(0.20) 
-47.54*** 
(1.08) 
ROC Area 0.94 0.87 0.78 0.70 
Actual vs Predicted 
R^2 
0.52 0.35 0.27 0.094 
Maximum Propensity 
Score Matching 
Distance 
0.070 0.064 0.032 0.036 
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Purpose and Activity Codes Aid, 5-mile radius. 
Average treatment affects reported above, with logistic models used to develop 
propensity scores below. Estimator values are reported with standard errors in 
parentheses.  
    * Significant at 10%  
  ** Significant at 5%  
*** Significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 Disease Incidence, 
with before 2008 
health aid 
 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2008 health aid 
 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2009 health aid 
 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2010 health aid 
 
Health Aid -0.0049 
(0.014) 
-0.040*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.050*** 
(0.012) 
-0.028** 
(0.012) 
 
Logistic Models Used to Develop Propensity Scores 
 Before 2008 
Health Aid 
2008 Health Aid 2009 Health Aid 2010 Health Aid 
Health Care Quality  0.0074 
(0.018) 
-0.082*** 
(0.023) 
-0.73*** 
(0.022) 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
0.21*** 
(0.025) 
-0.13*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.046*** 
(0.0047) 
0.1193*** 
(0.0051) 
Distance to Pop 
Center 
 
 
-0.034*** 
(0.00051) 
0.0063*** 
(0.00064) 
 
Wealth Perception    0.14*** 
(0.013) 
Poverty Level 0.37*** 
(0.012) 
0.16*** 
(0.0086) 
0.21*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
Presidential Ethnic 
Match 
-1.054*** 
(0.055) 
-1.58*** 
(0.037) 
-0.37*** 
(0.043) 
-1.065*** 
(0.038) 
Precipitation 0.021*** 
(0.00069) 
0.064*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0063 
(0.0044) 
-0.23*** 
(0.0051) 
Precipitation2  
 
-0.00019*** 
(0.000014) 
-0.0000010 
(0.000017) 
0.00089*** 
(0.000020) 
Elevation  0.078*** 
(0.0019) 
 
 
-0.052*** 
(0.0025) 
Elevation2  -0.00039*** 
(0.000010) 
 0.00030*** 
(0.000014) 
Temperature -0.074*** 
(0.0010) 
 0.21*** 
(0.017) 
 
Temperature2   -0.00062*** 
(0.000038) 
 
 
Intercept 10.20*** 
(0.20) 
-6.64*** 
(0.23) 
-12.96*** 
(1.89) 
17.90*** 
(0.32) 
ROC Area 0.82 0.79 0.85 0.79 
Actual vs Predicted 
R^2 
0.19 0.20 0.25 0.13 
Maximum Propensity 
Score Matching 
Distance 
0.059 0.050 0.046 0.035 
	   110	  
Purpose and Activity Codes Aid, 10-mile radius. 
Average treatment affects reported above, with logistic models used to develop 
propensity scores below. Estimator values are reported with standard errors in 
parentheses.  
    * Significant at 10%  
  ** Significant at 5%  
*** Significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 Disease Incidence, 
with before 2008 
health aid 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2008 health aid 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2009 health aid 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2010 health aid 
Health Aid 0.042 
0.033 
-0.041*** 
0.0075 
-0.041** 
0.016 
0.0048 
0.0066 
 
Logistic Models Used to Develop Propensity Scores 
 Before 2008 
Health Aid 
2008 Health Aid 2009 Health Aid 2010 Health Aid 
Health Care Quality 0.16*** 
(0.021) 
-0.027 
(0.019) 
 -0.64*** 
(0.022) 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
 -0.15*** 
(0.0040) 
-0.035*** 
(0.0053) 
0.13*** 
(0.0056) 
Distance to Pop 
Center 
 
 
-0.042*** 
(0.00055) 
-0.0075*** 
(0.00071) 
0.012*** 
(0.00058) 
Wealth Perception 0.41*** 
0.013 
0.32*** 
0.012 
  
Poverty Level  
 
 0.16*** 
0.012 
 
 
Presidential Ethnic 
Match 
-0.50*** 
(0.044) 
-1.79*** 
(0.039) 
-0.43*** 
(0.051) 
-1.09*** 
(0.033) 
Precipitation 0.019*** 
(0.00066) 
0.10*** 
(0.0037) 
0.045*** 
(0.0048) 
 
Precipitation2  
 
-0.00034*** 
(0.000014) 
-0.00019*** 
(0.000018) 
 
Elevation  0.084*** 
(0.0018) 
 
 
-0.062*** 
(0.0026) 
Elevation2  -0.00042*** 
(0.000010) 
 0.00034*** 
(0.000015) 
Temperature 0.62*** 
(0.023) 
 0.16*** 
(0.022) 
 
Temperature2 -0.0016*** 
(0.000056) 
 -0.00054*** 
(0.000048) 
 
 
Intercept -61.14*** 
(2.37) 
-8.76*** 
(0.25) 
-9.49*** 
(2.42) 
4.54*** 
(0.12) 
ROC Area 0.81 0.82 0.85 0.73 
Actual vs Predicted 
R^2 
0.20 0.25 0.29 0.10 
Maximum Propensity 
Score Matching 
Distance 
0.069 0.055 0.041 0.036 
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Purpose and Activity Codes Aid, 15-mile radius. 
Average treatment affects reported above, with logistic models used to develop 
propensity scores below. Estimator values are reported with standard errors in 
parentheses.  
    * Significant at 10%  
  ** Significant at 5%  
*** Significant at 1%
 Disease Incidence, 
with before 2008 
health aid 
 
Disease Incidence, 
with 2008 health 
aid 
 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2009 health aid 
 
Disease 
Incidence, with 
2010 health aid 
 
Health Aid -0.0097 
(0.049) 
-0.089*** 
(0.024) 
-0.027 
(0.028) 
-0.012 
(0.0081) 
 
Logistic Models Used to Develop Propensity Scores 
 Before 2008 
Health Aid 
2008 Health Aid 2009 Health Aid 2010 Health Aid 
Health Care Quality  -0.065*** 
(0.019) 
0.078** 
(0.034) 
-0.61*** 
(0.022) 
Distance to Health 
Facility 
-0.22*** 
(0.0074) 
-0.12*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.11*** 
(0.0066) 
 
Distance to Pop 
Center 
-0.13*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.046*** 
(0.00057) 
-0.025*** 
(0.00093) 
0.019*** 
(0.00060) 
Wealth Perception  0.24*** 
(0.013) 
  
Poverty Level -0.026** 
(0.013) 
 0.14*** 
(0.016) 
-0.076*** 
(0.010) 
Presidential Ethnic 
Match 
2.53*** 
(0.051) 
-1.8*** 
(0.040) 
0.39*** 
(0.086) 
-0.86*** 
(0.039) 
Precipitation  0.13*** 
(0.0038) 
0.090*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.0015** 
(0.00063) 
Precipitation2  
 
-0.00045*** 
(0.000015) 
-0.00035*** 
(0.000022) 
 
Elevation 0.034*** 
(0.00055) 
0.072*** 
(0.0016) 
 
 
-0.086*** 
(0.0031) 
Elevation2  -0.00036*** 
(0.0000091) 
 0.00044*** 
(0.000017) 
Temperature   -0.10*** 
(0.0015) 
 
Intercept -0.32*** 
(0.066) 
-9.35*** 
(0.24) 
22.07*** 
(0.58) 
6.44*** 
(0.16) 
ROC Area 0.94 0.82 0.89 0.72 
Actual vs Predicted 
R^2 
0.56 0.25 0.45 0.11 
Maximum Propensity 
Score Matching 
Distance 
0.071 0.054 0.038 0.039 
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